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INTRODUCTION

It 1s a commonplace amonv students of Athenian history that the
fourth century 1s not llke the fifth century. Where the fifth century tends to
the herOiC, the fourth century appears matter-of-fact; where the fifth century
Athenians produced exc.tttDg creative work on an unprecedented soa1e, fourthcentury Athen1ans often appear to have spent their whole lives in market place
or tn the law courts, and where fifth-eentury Athenians appear charged with the
vision of de sUny , the Athenians of the fourth century often appear rather warka-day. Such tnterpretaUons distort the true differences between the two
centuries, of course. But it 1s quite true that If one wishes to learn more of
everyday life tn ancient Athena, if one wants a knowledge of the bread-andbutter facts of Athenian existence, the fourth century provides much more
definite information. And because the Greeks of the whole classloal period
were men of flesh and blood and were not made of broue or marble, the study
of Athenian banking, finance, grain prices, wave., trade pollcie., laws,

population, and all the other factors which make up the socio-economic
complexus of this 0011. bas itl own tnterest.
The period of Demosthenes has become the center for IUch
studies because of the abundance of records datinv from this time. Fifty-nine

speechea attributed to Demoathenes are extant aa well as speeches by
Aeachin.a, Dinarchus, and Hyperides, pamphlets by boerates, writill9s attributed to Xenophon, treatises from Aristotle' s pen, fragments of historians, and
inscriptions by the aeon.
Becauae of the centrallmportanoe of this period, much wock haa
been going on in recent years to interpret it more adequately. But perhaps it
would be more correct to say that this new work in larve measure represents a
re-interpretation of the period. Demoathenes himself remains the central
figure of this era; but where before he was pictured .a a dem1-god, a man of
unbounded genius thwarted only by the crasaness of the multitude and the perveraity of his political opponents, these new .cholars--G. L. Qlwkwell,
Raphael Sealey, and, of a somewhat earUer period, Sir Arthur PickardCambridge, to mention a few-are making an bon.at effort to discover
Demosthene. as be really was. And they have determined in some instances
that Demosthenea, had feet of clay. True, some of the new work is of a
'de-bunkin;' nature, an effort to destroy not only the myth surrounding
Demosthenel but the very worth of the man himself. But most of it represents
diligent and careful re.earch to find out the true nature and character of the
policies of Demoathenes and his opponents.

(3)

This paper will follow this newer pattern. It represents an effort

to unravel and to clarify one of the more tangled policies of this era, the
Theor1c Fund. This Fund, sometimes known 1ncorrect1y as the Theater Fund,
is continually mentioned in many documents of the period. From this it appears that it was one of the more important Athenian fiscal measures. Writes
/

J. van Ooteghem, "I.e theoricon est un des pivots de
au

we siecle av. 1. - c .,
\

I

1a polttique athenienne
/

\

et un des themes les plus frequemment traite. par lea

orateura de l,epoque. III
Our modern age has been called the age of the anti-hero. This is

reflected in our drama, our literature, and even in the attitudes of the man on
the street. Perhaps that 1s why modem man has ltttle patience fOl' the romantic portraits of the Ufe of Demosthenes (or of the Gracchi or of George Washingo
ton or of Lincoln) which sometimes characterize the scholarship of the last
century. And so Demosthenes and the others have been fOl'ced to vacate their
lofty pedestals and rub should«s with Common Man. This is Just insofar .s
all men "are from the dust and all return to the dust.

fI

Nonetheles., some men

in the short course of their Uves step out befOl'e the mass of humanity and
guide them forward whether to good or to evil. Some men lead, oth«s are led.
1

/

\

/

1. van Ooteghem, 8J., "Demosthene et la theorique, I' l4!.

Etudes Classigues, I (1932), 388.

(4)

And so the hero cannot and must not altogether die. It will be the effort of
the writer In interpreting Demosthenes and his milieu to avoid romantic
soarings on the one hand and pessimistic nihilism on the other. It 1s hoped
that the real worth and renown of Demosthenes may emerge mere clearly
through this study.

CHAPTER I

SCHOlARLY OPINION ON THE NATURE OF THE THEORIC FUND

It Is of considerable importance in this discussion of the Tbeorio
Fund to begin by a consideration of the basic opinions and theories which
modern scholarship has developed.
Several scholars are of the opinion that the Theoric Fund was very
small and that, consequently, Demosthenes allowed himself to become greatly
disturbed over a rather minor matter. They hold that this Is a repre.entative
instance of Demosthenes' failure to grasp political rea11tle.. Such, for
example, is the position of Ulrich Kahr.tedt. 1 III his eyes this fund existed
solely to enable the people to obtain seats for performances at the theater.
The state estabU.hed an entrance fee of two obols and I Kahrstedt informs us,
this money' was paid back to the city, which gave one of the two obols to the
theater manager while retaining the other. Originally the money wa. given
1Ulrtch Kahrstedt, "Demosthenes und die Theorika, ..
N§qbricht!n yon der Ge.ellsch,ft dar Wissenschaften zu Gott!naen: Phil .Hist. Klass., 1929, 156-63.

1

2

only at the three-day City Dtonysta. But later the Theoric Fund was distributed 'on the festival days.·2 ICahrstedt suggests that the monetary distribution took place not only on the City Dionysia but also on the Panathenaia, the
Lenata, the HephaisUa, and on whatever other festivals had theater presentations. Kahrstedt refers to two texts, Dinarehus i. 56 and Hyperides 1. 26, and
concludes that the total payment to anyone person in the course of a year was
about five drachmas. 3 Multiplying this figure by the number of citizens (about
20,000) and making deduct10ns for those who lived in the country, the rich,
and others who wouldn tt bother to collect, Kahrstedt arrives at a figure of
60,000 drachmas a year as the total sum the state would payout, of whioh it
would receive back again (making allowance for those who would spend their
two obols in taverns instead of attending the theater) 20,000 drachmas. Since
only this small sum of 40,000 drachmas (less than 1 talents) is involved
Kahrstedt writes aiming a shaft at Demosthenes: "Abet man versteht jetzt
schlechterdings nieht, warum slch Jemand Uber die Theorika--als fiir die
athenische Finanzen ruinos--aufregen kann. Sle verschlingen allenfaUs
40,000 Drachmen, das Reiterkorps aber gagen 240,000 (Xen .!iUm..l.19 .) ... 4
2 Kahrstedt cites Demoathenes 1. 20.
3Kahrstedt, Ngcbricbten , •. , 1929, 159.

4.D;WL, 160-61.

3

Suoh a position, frequently is held by those who are critical of
Demosthenes. But in this Ues its very weakness. Passing over for the moment
the question of Demosthenes' ability as a stateaman, one may ask whether a
position which leavea him pictured as inoompetent and inept 1s truly aooeptable. It must be remembered that Demosthenes led the Athenian people (as
far as anyone in the fourth century ever did this) from about 343 until after 330.
There 1s here a question as to whether Demosthenes, who in several of his
major speeches disoussed the Theono Fund, and stressed its importance in the
total financial arrangements for the state, spoke as an intelligent man or as a
fool to be laughed oif the atmI for making so much O\lt of something absurdly
small. Simple probability seems to work against such a small figure being
assigned to the Tbeorlc Fund. Further, there is also the problem of explaining
Eubulus' importanoe in the state. He apparently was not an orator: rather his
name is oonstantlY associated with finanoial matters in general and with the
TheoricFund in partioular. If the Theodc Fund was truly "small beer" as
A.H.M. Jones, a follower of Kahrstedt in this matter, would have it, explaining Eubulus' importanoe becomes an intensely diffioult proposition. 5
SA. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democrata' (Oxf«d; Basil Blackwell,
1957), p. 34.

4

If the Kahrstedt position were true, then, indeed, Jones must be

COITect

wh.n

he writes that "Demosthen.s was rather foolish to make himself and his
policy unpopular by trying to transfer it (the Theoric Fund) to the war fund
even in peace time ... 6 An inescapable problem exists with such a position.
G. L. C&wkwell also holds to this low f19ure fOl' distributions, but

is aware of the probl.ms outlined above and fOl'Bluiates his position with ragard to the Theoric Board and the functions of this administrative body

accCl'd1ngly, as shall be seen. 7
Quite at the opposite end of the spectrum is the opinion that the
Theoric Fund was, in reality, very large, a question of distributing several
hundred talents each year. The major proponent of such a position 1s Henri
Franootte • 8 It is his contention that the Theone Fund distributions were not
simply used to help defray the cost of attending thelleatar but were principally
doles. All oitiZens were equal--equal even before the budget. Thoee who

7 G. L. CawkweU,
LXXXIII (1963), 43.

8

II

Eubulu8, " Journal

of Hell!Dig Studies,

""
"',."
\
Henri Francotte, "Etudes
sur Demosthene:
Demosthene
et la
theor1que," Musee hlq!. XVII (1913), 69-89. Bee also Henri Franootte,
/
/
L'Induatrie dins l a~
C ! Anct!nae (Brussels: Societe
Beige de Libra1re,
1900-01), pp. 37-52.

5

performed various ta.k. for the .tate received paY' those who did not received Theonc di.tr1butlona. Such diltr1buUona thus aro.e out of tile democzatic lnltlncta of the Athenian people, all oit1&_ by r19ht share 1n all
privilege I • The Theor1o lund for Prancotte 18 a fourth-century verlion of the

fiftb-century diobel1a, a ....ure 1nltltuted by Qeopbon to give reUef to the
poor through dally (apparentlY) welfare payments of two obol.. In the Ie•• af-

fluent time. of the fourth century the re.ources of the state 1n day-t~y
praot1oe permitted .uch a dally di.tribution only irregularly, though the 01*'8-'

tift principle remained: two obol. a day for ......,one not engaged in the

Courts, the Councll f the _glltnlct•• , or 1n mW.tary .ervice. The•• di.tribu-

tiona would have beaD financed by u.ing all the unallocated fund. from the
revenue. (the .urplus.a); and Francotte feels that there would be COIlstant

pre.sure to PUt more aAd DlOI'e money 1n thhr Fund. Th. Theor1c Fund becomes
In this interpretation 8 basle social welfare measure of the radical democrats.

Whlle Francotte himself ta quite cr1Ucal of the 'f.beor1c Fund f he 11 a principal

witnels to It. egal1tarian character.
Since .Francotte suggest. that the Thecrlc Fund would be given
(under Ideal circumstances) 1n a two-obol dally distribution to 8U tho.e not

6

directly working for the atate, Jamea Buchanan9 proposes that Francotte had in

mind a Fund in which up to 400 talents a year would be spent. It doe ••ea.
clear enough that Francotte felt that the annual figure for these welfare distribution ran rather higb, for he f8C09nized that only by assigning a generally

high figure to the Theor1o Fund could the fact that Demosthenes wanted to
finance expeditions by using thi. money be explained. But 1t 18 not quite so
ev1dent that Francotte was ta1k.1no' in terms of 300 to 400 talents a year, fot he
asatgned the dole only to tho•• not engag.d in the perfOl'JDllnce of oivio dutie.
and also l'8Cogn1&.d that tha two-obol dal1y di.tribution wes an Ideal af the
democrats, not a reality aab1eved in dally praottce.
With the general outlines of Franootte's position both A. M.
11
Andread•• 10 and W. Schwahn ••em to ooncur, though neither 91ve8 prec1ae
data on the amount of the Fund.

91ames J. Buchanan, "ThtqiJca: A Study of Monetary Distributions
to the Athenian C1t1aenry c:lurlag the Fifth and Fourth Centurie. B. C." (unpubllahed Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Cla ••lcl, Princeton Universlty, 1954),
pp. 139-40.
10A. M. ADdreadeI, A H1ItWY qf Cbtk "WIle F1Mpc., trans.
carroll N. Brown (2d ad. rev.; CaIDbrlc:lge, Mass.: Harvard 11. Press, 1933),
pp.260-62.

11Schwabn. "Theortkon," PaulYa RMlepqyplopeed1t der
Cla.s1tqbtn AlttrtumawtIMuchtft, Zwelte Rathe, Zehnter Halbband,
001. 2234.

7

This position 1s important in that it clearly recognizes that whlle
the TIleoric Fund may have originally been concerned with furnishing money to
the citizens for their theater seats, it was something more than this in the time
of Eubulul and Demosthenes. Assuredly it Is only In such terms that the importance of the Fund in the second half of the fourth century can be recognized.
But problems remain. Any theory which would assign 300-400
talents a year to TIlearic Pund payments (if Francotte may be interpreted in this
manner) runs up against the plain fact that in a good year no more than 400-450
talents were collected as revenue by the state .12 It is impossible to believe
that even as much as half this amount was used for public distributions. And
the 400-talent revenue represents a peak sum in the fourth century, certainly
not an average. Aristotle also records the great care which the Councll took
in checking on those who applied to receive a dally two-abol welfare payment
given to those who were disabled (adunotoJ.) .13 It may rightly be asked 1£ the
Council would show so much concern over the claims of the disabled if a regular payment was given virtually dally in any case. The Theonc Fund cannot
have been an actual two-obol dally dole. Money for such payments was Just
not available. Whlle some authors delight in picturing the perversity of the
12 Demo sthenes x. 38.
13Aristotle Atb. Pol. 49. 4.

8

fourth-century Athenians, the fact of the matter is that most citizens felt a
great responsibility toward the welfare of their mliJ and were not willing to
lavish huge sums of money on thems.l ves while the administration of the
government and military defense measures went to ruin.
Perhaps the most generally accepted position as regards the
Theoric Fund is that of Boeckh. Augustus Boeckh in his great work The Public
Economy of the AtheniAns (Die Staatshaushaltung der Atbenw) held that though
the Theoric Fund began in a very limited fashion, in Demosthenes' time the
state was making distributions to about 18,000 people of two ohols per citIzen
on about 2S-30 festivals a year.

14

For Boeckh the Theoric Fund was a festival

fund, and the continual pressure was to extend this distribution to more and
more festivals. The Fund was a "gratification II of the masses, 15 a promotion
of the "private interest of the citizens, ,,16 a "flll1ng {9f] the purse of each
individual at the common cost.

17
If

Since in the time of Demosthenes the Fund

14Augustus Boeckh, The Publiq Economy of the Athenians, trans.
Anthony Lamb from the 2d German ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1857),
pp. 309-11.
lSB?!,sL, 302.

16llWL, 250.
17.II;WL

9

was supported by the surpluses from the revenues received by the state,
Boeckh held that in a good year distributions of a drachma or more per man at
each festival might be made. Thus the cost of the fund ranged from 25 to as
high as 90 talents a year. Boeckh assumed that the distributions would alwaYs
be made on determined festivals and that therefore the people would try to increase this number of festival days.
James Buchanan in his dissertation on monetary distributions to the
Athenians specifically opts for the Boeckh interpretation .1S For him as for
Boeckh the Theoric Fund underwent a change from "theater-money" to "festivalmoney. ,,19 1. van Ooteghem also takes this same view and calls the Theoric

,

" ..

Fund "essentiellement une maniere de satisfa1re les instincts egoistes du
peuple. ,,20 Such is also the Judgment of Gustave Glotz. 21 And it seems that
Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, George Grote, and 1. B. Bury take roughly the same

position with roughly simUar Judgments.
ISBuchanan,141.
19WsL.,

ss.

201. van Ooteghem, S1., "oemosthene et la theorique, .. !u.
Etydes Classiquel, I (1932), 39S.
21 Gustave Glotz, The Greek City and Its InsUtutions, trans.
N. Mallinson (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1929), p. 340.

10

The important pOint about the Boeckh position is that it recognizes
that the Theoric Fund had an essential connection with Athenian festivals,
while at the same time it avoids the pitfall of making the fund solely connected
with theatrical presentations. Several problems occur, however, There is a
certain rigidity in the estimates of the total yearly distribution, an assumption,
seemingly, that even in more diffioult times the people could sWl count on
their distributions. But in the period after the Social War Athens had little
revenue and did not use that for such distributions. Secondly, there is no
reference made to the public works program which was in the hands of the board
controlling the Theoric Fund. The Fund and this program, as shall be seen, are
closely related. Finally, the view offered of the Theoric Fund is that it was a
measure wanted only by the irresponsible elements in the state, who clamored
for bread and circus and ignored any real needs of the

~.

Such a view re-

cognizes neither the true position of Demosthenes as regards the Fund nor the
statesmanship of Eubulus.
Various scholars, particularly certain critics of Athenian drama,
delineate the Boeckh position somewhat further and explain the distributions as
enabling the citizens to buy food with which to celebrate their festivals and to
join in the festal entertainment. In the words of Octave Navarre, lIelles [Jhe

11

distributions avaient alors pour but de permettre aux indigents de s'accorder I

~ l'occasion de la fete, une joumee de chomage et un mel11eur repas." 22
A. E. Haigh 23 and Arnold Schaefer24 al so adopt this explanation. Again I of
course, this position recognizes the festal character of the Theoric Fund, but
the evidence for this being the purpose of the fourth-century Fund is not
adequate and the explanation itself limits radically the purpose, scope" and
consequent importance of the Fund.
The final position to be considered is that evolved by G. L.
220. NavalTe, "Theorikon, Th.Orika," Dict19lJll!1r. des
Antiquites Grecgues et Romaine" ed. Edmond Saglio, V, 207.
23A." E. Haigh, The Attic Theatre (2d ed. rev.; Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1898), pp. 370-71.
24Amo1d Schaefer, Demosthenes und Seine Zeit (2d ed. rev.;
Leipzig: B. G. Teubner Verlag, 1886-87), II, 150.

12

Cawkwell. 25 His basic insight is that a distinction is necessary between the
Theoric Fund distributions (which he reserves for the purpose of providing
funds for the citizenry wishing to attend the public theater) and the totality of
functions of the Theoric Board. Thus he rejects any link of the Theoric Fund
with the diobelia-type daily dole and limits the size of annual distributions to
fifteen talents or less. 26 But since this was only one function of the Theoric
25Since his first article in 1960, G. L. Ce.wkwell, an English
scholar, has produced a series of carefully worked articles which provide a
sweeping re-interpretation of the period of Demosthenes. Ce.wkwell reacts
vigorously against the strongly pro-Demosthenes scholarship which characterized much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. For Cawkwell
Demosthenes is not a lone patriot proclaiming a way of salvation which his
fellow citizens, mired in pleasure and ennui, refused to hear, but a political
leader (who happened also to be a very good speaker) who sometimes offered
good programs for the people to follow but who often tended not to see the actual realities which Athens had to deal with. His first article, "Aeschines and
the Peace of Phllocrates" (Rewe des Etudes Grecques, LXXIII (1960), 416-38)
was an effort to prove that the policy of Aeschines in 346 was neither shortsighted nor pacifist. A brief article "Demosthenes and the Stratiotic Fund"
(Mnemosvne, Series 4, XV (1962), 377-83) was an effort to show that
Demosthenes could not have been the founder of such a fund. His "The Defense of Olynthus" (Classical Quarterly, LVI, No.1 (May, 1962), 122-40.)
reassessed the history of that period. A two-part article, "Demosthenes'
Policy After the Peace of Phllocrates" (Classical Qyarterly, XIII N.S. (May
and Nov., 1963),
120-~8 ; 200-13.) discuss Athenian history from 346-40.
Most important with ,e{lard to the Theoric Fund is his article "Eubulus"
Uoumal of Hellenic Studies, LXXXIU (1963), 47-67.), which attempts to better
explain and to vindicate the policy of Eubulus.
26G. L. Cawkwell, JOurnal of Hellenic Stydies, LXXXIII, 53-54.

13

Board, it is necessary to look elsewhere to discover what made this Board so
important. Since the surpluses of the revenues were assigned to the Theoric
Fund, the Board had a relatively large sum of money at its disposal, part of
which it used for the regular theater distributions, while the remaining part,
the lion' s share in a good year, was devoted, he argues, to public works such
as the development of the navy, the building of ship sheds f the repair of roads,
and other military and non-military projects. It is this fact which gave the
Theoric Board and, consequently, Eubulus their prc,minence in the administration of affairs. Strangelq enough, Buchanan appears to have had the same insight, but mentions it only in passing without stopping to explore its significance.

27
This position, based as it is on several important Dut heretofore

inadequately explained texts is most important for explaining the significance cf
the Theoric Fund in the thinking of Demosthenes. But it does seem that
Cawkwell, intent on making his pOint as regards public works and diminishing,
consequently, the importance of the theoric distributions, has neglected other
key texts. Basically he ignores the use of the Theoric Fund as a means of
direct public welfare and of redistribution of wealth as, it shall later be main27 Suchanan, 90.

14

tained, the Fourth Philippic in particular indicates that it was.
Such are the basic positions. And, with the possible exception of
the first, all contribute basic knowledge of the nature of the Theoric Fund. But
at the same time each appears to have within itself certain basic inadequacies.
These have been pointed out in only sketchy fashion at this pOint. For it 1s
clear that the real task at hand is not really the business of refutation but of
putting forward what it is hoped are positions solidly founded on all the
available evidence. But such an operation can only proceed in a dialectic
with the work done by these scholars and much be carried out in constant explicit and implicit reference to it.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE THEORlC FUND

The Theorio Fund has reoeived muoh disparagement and oondemnation from various students of Greek history. VI/e have, for example, this
remark of Gustave Glotz: "Always inadequate and always being increased, the
funds for publio grants the Theorio Fund oorrupted the regime, dissipated in
alms the resouroes neoessary for essential servioes and dragged to the abyss
the treasury and the oity. ,,1 And the modern Greek eoonomist A. M. Andreades
oalled the Fund the "canoer that caused Athens' death ... 2 Before we can
challenge such Judgments, we must have a clear idea of the nature of this
Fund. Our task is not to produce a brand-new theory unrelated to previous
soholarship, but to bring some order into the welter of eXisting soholarly work
and to develop certain pOints neglected thus far. Our goal in this chapter, thaI}
is to present a comprehensive view of the Theonc Fund as a public institution
1Gustave Glotz, The Greek City and Its Insytutions, trans. N.
lViallinson (London: Kagan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1929), p. 341.

2A. M. Andreades, A History of Greek Public Finance, trans.
Carroll N. Brown (2d ed. rev.J Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1933),
p. 267.
15

16
in Athens.
We begin with the basic position that the Theoric Fund is, a distribution of public money to the citizens of the Athenian state. Such a
sharing by members of a Greek community in the public assets was not a new
thing in Greek life. As far back as the Heroic Period such distributions seem
to have taken place. It was then a question of cattle being used for money and
taxation. To pay such taxes as there were, men brought cattle to a temple or
shrine and would then join in public meals, feasting, naturally enough, on the
cattle. This sharing was an expected part of the proceedings. 3 In the sixth
century there is record in Herodotus of the Siphnians having the custom of distributing extraordinary public revenues, such as those from mining, among
themselves. 4 In early fifth century Athens we find a somewhat similar case:
"In the archonship of Nicodemus, when the mines in Maroneia came to light
and the state had a surplus of one hundred talents from their exploitation, some
men proposed to distribute the money among the people. liS Themistocles
stepped in, however, and induced the people to spend the money on their
fleet for the war against Aegina. James Buchanan, referring to Plutarch, is of

31J2!sL, 210.
4Herodotus History 111. 57.
5Arlstotle Atb. Pol. 22. 7.

17

the opinion that the Athenians did have public distributions of one sort or
another prior to this, but that the amount of money involved was not as significant. 6 It seems that there were also distributions in the later part of the
century, a distribution involving the surplus of the revenues. 7
Such practices may seem strange to us. Capital must be accumulated, not dispersed in wasteful distributions. We may be quite right in our
judgment, but then we remind ourselves that we are formed in the patterns of
nineteenth and tVlentieth century capitalism, not in the patterns of life found
in the Greek .RQ.!!§. The Greeks, along with many other ancient and primitive
peoples, believed that the income of the community belonged to the multitude
of individual citizens. 8 The state was not looked upon as a separately functioning set of institutions but as the sum of individuals within a certain
geographical area. A polis is not a national state.
Another distribution in the Athenian state, a distribution out of
which the fourth century Theoric Fund seems to have come, was the distribu-

SJames J. Buchanan, "Theorlka: A Study of Monetary Distributions
to the Athenian Citizenry during the Fifth and Fourth Centurie s B. C. (unpublished rh. D. dissertation, Dept. of Classics, Princeton University, 1954),
pp. 12-13.
II

7Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum4 91, 49-52.

8Victor Ehrenberg, The Greek State (New York: Barnes and Noble,
1960), p. 83.
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bution giving all citizens money with which to attend the theater festivals
( 1"0 gerop'HOV ). Libanius tells the story of the beginning of this fund:
Since among the Athenians in ancient times the theater was not made of
stone, but the seats were oonstructed of wood, everyone struggBd to get
a place and fights took place and people were hurt. Wishing to stop this
the leaders of the Athenians charged a prioe for the theater seats. Each
then had to pay two obols and had to have a reserved seat. So that the
poor might not appear to be harmed by the expense, it was arranqed that
each get the two oOOls from public funds (~H 1"otJ Orn1 t)OtoJ9
The Scholiast to Demosthenes also indicates that before the reserved seat plan
was adopted rich individuals would scalp blocks of seats, 10 while the
Scholiast for Lucian's Timon speaks of fights taking place and of people gett1n
theater places the night before the spectacle. 11
Scholars, ancient and modern, in discussing this Theater Fund are
in unanimous agreement that the sum involved was two obols per day. Octave
/

/

Navarre says on this pOint: "C'etait une subvention foumie par l'Etat
/

,

.

athenien a tous les c1toyens pauvres pour leur permettre de payer Ie prix
9L1banius, AmumeD,ta Qretionum Demosthenicarum: Hvpoth. Ol..&.
L..8-9.
1 0Schol, Demosthenes i. 9. 1.

11 Sohol. Lucian Timon 49. Confer also Etvmologlst9n Magnum
s.v. 9£roptKOV dpxuplov and PhoUus Lexicon s.v. 9£WptKl •
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" au theatre,
//\
" .
...
12 This is
d'entree
c'est-a-dire
deux oboles par jour de fete."

only to record the words of Libanius and the later lexicographers. Suidas,
Photius, and the writers of the Etymoloaicon Magnum on the pOint .13 There is
some talk of a drachma being- involved

l4

, but this plainly refers to the three-

day City Dionysia. There is also a fair amount of agreement that these distributions began around the time of Cleophon. 15 Thus the Athenian state around
the end of the fifth century was spending about 3 1/3 talents annually to
assure order in the theater and that all could share in these religious events.
This was the early Theoricof!.
Note that we say lIearly Theoricon. II This word, 9£oop t Kav , has
been a source of massive ambiguity. It is not surprising to discover that such
a fund was in its inception linked with the theater--the word in its etymology
hints strongly at that (e£cnp{a.------eeCDP1Kov). But it is certain that the
nature of this fund change with the passage of time in some way. Even Ulrich
120ctave Navarre, La Th~atre Grec (Paris: Payot, 1925), p. 247.
13IJbanlus Argumtntl Or,ftiODU, Dtmo",en.t.carum: HYP9tb. 01. I.
8-9., S~idas Lexicon s.v. 9£ooptKOV Ka.t 9£oopo(n.~ Photiu} Lexicon s.v.
9Eoopnta ., and Etymologicon Magnum s.v. Ge:mpt){ov <Ipx u ptov •
14Sc hol. Luoian Timon 49 is the chief souroe for this position.
15Plutarch Ar1sW!!, 24 says "after the death of Pericles. II
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Kahrstedt admits that. However, the name does not change. So, wh1le the
fund Is a different thing in the time of Demosthenes (bow very different will be
shown shortly), the name remains the same.
A proble. also artaes regarding the founder of the Theone Fund.

But, we may ast, the founder of wb1cb fund? The early Fund? That Is one
thinG. The Fund as in the time of Demosthene.? That 1. quite another. It
would s.em that those dlacu.a1n9 the question 01. the TIleorlc Fund have rather
continually stumbled upon this point of ambiguity without truly recognizing it.
But there 18 a parUal reason for W. fallure. There was another
form of distribution of public money at the end of the f1lth century-the ··.. _1o....oo.,iA.
Many .cholers have wl8hed to link the t:wo fuDcls, aome have even wished to
a.sume thatesCDptlf.-1V and 6t(J.)!3£At"a were two names for the sam. th1n9. 16
Th. reason i. not d1ff1cult tolbld: both •••• to have appeared about the same

time in Greek history and both involve two obola. However, .uch a link-up of
the two dtstr1butlono must he
The

reJe~ted.

dJ.obt11l i.defined in the Anecdote Graeqa (to use the read1n.9

of the Codex Marc1anu. 530, which scholar. prefer)

. t. 17

a.

It

~P£} 0

{

Ouo, oil's

The founder of thl. fund ls de-

16B. G.)Naverre, 247.
17An!cdota QrafCI •• v. Ii tel' Se ?\ i a •

21

clared by th. writer of the Con.t1S»t1on of

the ASheNAn,

to have be.n

Cl.opbon .18 Expend1ture. from tht. fund are mentioned in th. report. of th.
trea.ure. of Athena Polta. and Ath.na Hike for th. year. 410/9 and 407/6.

19

In 407/6, accord1ng to the.e in.cription., the payments were sharply reduced.

Xenophon report. that In 406 Arched.mu., a leader of the pooular party, had
charg. of thl. fund. 20 This ind1cate. that the fund

its.lf was a deDlOCl'aUc

meaaure. After 405, wh.n .Ar1.topbane. alluded to the

d1obtl1A In the Froq.~l

we do not hear of thia fund.
Should this fund be connect.d with the tbeortkon ?

No, .ay.

WUalllOWltB-Moell.ndorff, who•• po.lUon 1. not mo.t commonly accepted. He

con.ider. thl. fund to beve been a .ort of .tate-penslon, a public r.U.f

mea.ure. H. recall. the fact that many in th. be.leged city of Athen. had left
their po•••••ion. behind th.m and had a right to .ome help from the .tat••
Cleopbon therefore set up thi. fund and al.o began again th. pubUc work. pro18.Ar1.tot1. Ash, fgl,. 28. 3.
19 Marcu. N. rod, Ie Sel.cUon of Qq. Ht.toJ1al wmRUon. to
the .End of th. FUth QtnswY B, C t (2d ad.
Oxford: Clarendon Pre•• ,
1933), 83; 92.

rev.,

20xenophon Itlltn1qf 1. 7. 2.
21Arl.tophan••

frog, 140.
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gram of Perioles

80

that work could be given to the people. This is an In-

ltano.', wrlt.1 Wllamowita, of the ltate acting al a oorporatlon which dlvidel
ItI dlvid.nd. with all the abare-holderI .22 W1lh.lm Schwahn hold. a slmU.ar
Vi.w,23 a. doe. lame. Buchanan, who .tr••••• that this fund would b. for
tho •• who remained unemployed. 24 Two obol. would be given daJly under this
fund to tho.e in need.
There are then, only .uperficial .imnariUe.between the early
Theorio

Fu~

and the sU0be11a. In th. time of Demosth.n.s, however, the

'lheor1o Fund, as .hall be proved shortly, took on many characteristlol of the

dl,obtlil of the fifth century. Thi. no doubt led a number of scholar. to Unk
the early Th.one Fund and the d10be11l.
And .0 the problem as to who was the founder of the Theor1o Pund

onc. more presents itself. It leem. likely tIlat the early Th.ono Fund or
Theater Fund was 1naUtuted during the Periclean period or .hortly thereafter.
Plutarch .tat.s this Ullequlvocally (though hi. authority Is by no meanl ab.a22Ulrloh von WllamowitJ:-Moellendorff, MIlot.!,. und m,n
(Berlin: Weidmann.ahe Buobbandlung, 1893), pp. 212-15.
2 3w• Schwahn, MTheorikon, II PJulya BHl,ngyclopaedi, slet
Cla••iach.n Altertumlwi"!p.gbaft, Zw.it. Rathe, Zehnter Halbband, 001 ••
2233-37.

24Buohanan, 71-74.
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lute!) Plutarch's theory Is that Pericles, not having the private wealth which
Clmon, hi. rival, pos.essed and which be used to influence the poor, had recourse to the distribution of the people's own wealth in f.sUval grants
(9£IDP ''KO t S ), jurors' wages, and other modes of. larvesse. 25 The Demos-

thene. Schol1ast says, "Pedcles wes the first to make thes. public funds
theorlc-money( ••• ,-a xpnlla,-a ,-aO,-a -ra. 0111100't(1 9£IDPt'Ka. l7tOt'flO'£V il;
dpXflS

lTtl

d

r:£P1Kl\Tis • • • ). 26 -lbrtber, we have the statement of Zenoblus:

A \ ocpav-rou

'-0

geIDp t 'KOV lYEve,-o bpawn ••••27 The

Dlopbantus men-

Uoned seems to refer to the archon in 395/4. If the distribuUon was indeed
Increased to a drachma (though in

the period of the

Corinthian War this is

SOI8&

what bard to understand), it may be arvued that such a di.tribuUon orlginated

earlier. The historian Ph110cb.0rus is also cited by HarpocraUon as refelTing to
the Theor1c Fund in the third book of his AtthJ.s tn

Y-rf; (~

-~,. r:i;-0 C;), a book

25Plutaroh Periqles 9. 1-3. Confer also 7. 2. and 34. 1.
26SC!\Ol's Demosthenes J.. 9. 1. The Scholiast to Aeschines also
says this <Schol. Aegcbine. 111. 24.).
xaAaCU'O'(1.

27 Zenobius 111. 27. Cited in Hesychlus Lexicon s. v • ~ p a X11

n

24

which is believed to
GaJlUD!l should read

end with events in 449 .28

But some suggest that the

b.Ia. (Book Six, consequently). But much more telling is

the fact that the Theoric Fund was introduced at a time when the theater seats
were constructed of wood (lxp{a

~uA{va

) .We know that this was so during

the whole fifth century and on into the fourth unW the "Theater of Lycurgus JI
was finished. Pauaanias tells us that Lycwvus completed the theater which
others had begun ClTCe-reAe:cre; '\lEV TO 9e;aTpov

iTepa~v uTCap~allivIDv)' 29

This points to a founding of the 'l'beoric Fund no later than the early part of
the fourth century, for during the turbulent times of the mid-part of the century
little work would have been done on a project of this nature. Coupled with the
previous evidence presented, this factor is an additional indication that the
early Theone Fund dates to the last half of the fifth century. That Pericles was
the originator seems quite possible, even likely.
But not all has been said on this POint. The historian Justin
(second century A •D.) says: "Tunc [at the time of Epaminondas-·c. 360
vectigal publicum, quo antee mtUtes et remiges alebantur, cum urbano populo

"
9e;roptxa.

28Harpocration Lg1qQn in Decem Oretores Atticos s. v.
29Pausantas Desqiption

of GreecI i.

29. 6.

2S

dividi coeptum ... 30 But this 1s not a clear reference to the Theor1con as a
Theater Fund. Some further evidence may be provided by the argument from
silence. Van Ooteghem 31 and G. L. C8wkwe1l 32 point out that neither
Aristotle (in the Con.Ytut19n

of the Athenians or elsewhere) nor Aristophanes-

two writers from whom we would certainly expect a reaction--nor any fifth century

writer makes mention of the Theoric Fund in any clear fashion. However,

it may be said that the 3 1/3 talents cost would hardly cause a ripple in the
fifth-century Athenian economy. It was indeed at this period "very small
beer. II James Buchanan wishes to make something of a case for the popular
leader Agyrrhius (c. 390) being the found... But to make this assertion he is
forced to brush aslde the testimony of the Scholiasts and of Zenobius. Our
cautious conclusion ls theref«e that the Theone Fund as a Theater Fund began
in the middle or late fifth century.
The subsequent history of the Theone Fund up until the middle of
the fourth century is most oh.owe. We shall not attempt to trace 1t, for evldence to guide the researcher 1s simply absent.
30JusUn Hlstory of Trw»s Pomptlus vi. 9.
31
~,/
",
J. van Ooteghem, S1, "Demosthene et la theorique, " 111.
Etudes Clas.1aue., I (1932), 391; 397.
32G. L. cawkwell, "Eubulus," Journal of Hellenic Studie.,
LXXXIU (1963), SS.
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We therefore come to the end product of this process of development, the Theoric Fund as it appeared in the time of Demosthenes. This is the
central problem; the previous conSiderations provide necessary background in'"
formatton.
First of all, there 1s an association of the Theoric Fund with not
only drama festivals but with festival days in general. Scholars generally
agree that there was a change Maus Sohaugeldem zu Festgeldem "33 Much
ancient evidence exists foe this. In the EtxD!91oqicon Magnum it is stated
that Theoric money was distributed by the oity on communal festival days

('T'(J.T~ 'Kotvaic; lop'T'o.Tc; ).34 Pollux tells us that Theoric money refers to
....
(
..
,
....
TO. e S Tas EOpTqS 'Kal gemv

..

-"

TI~as T~ ~A~e£t

,

ve~o~eva.

.. 35 8uida s

also says that Tbeoric money was given out on festival days (TaTs lOp1C1Tq. 36
That this represents an actual change, an enlarging of the Fund, 1s accepted b
33A. Motzki. Bubulo. von J!roI;!allDtbos unci 8etne F1nanapol1tiJs.
p. 5a. As cited in Buchanan, 85. (Diss. Konigsberg, 1903.)
34 Ety11'1Qloqlcon Magnum s.v. geOOpt'KOv dpyuptoV

35Pollux OnoIM.UCOn vill. 113.
36Su ldas Legdcop s.v. 9Empt'KOV l(at geropt'K')
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van Ooteghem31 , Kahrstedt,38 and Busolt,39 to name a few. Demosthenes
himself gives excellent testimony that this was the case in his time. He mentions a distribution on the Panathenaea,

40

while in the Speech on OrqanizatiQD

he says that the people will seize upon a festival ~op"n

) or some other pre-

text for a public distribution. 41 In the First Olwthiac Demosthenes hints
broadly that the people must stop using their surplus revenue for festivals
(£ I c;

,.a<;

~op,.cic; ). but appropriate it for military purposes. 42
This association with festivals is rather important. The Theor1c

Fund started in conjunction with the drama festivals--truly religious actions.
This religious orientation the Fund retainl even in its new character. "No
doubt, fI Pickard-Cambridge admits, "the distribution had a certain religious
color. The festivals were all in honor of the gods, and there was at least a
31van Ooteghem,

LeI judes OWs,lau,s. I, 398.

38Ulrlch ICahrstedt, ttDemolthfanes und die Theortka, tt HI,gb,[1Qhttn yop der Gesell,cbaft der WlsalP8chaU,n zH GOttinSlen: Phil ,-Hlat.
Jg.a.s., 1929, 159.
3 9 GeOl'9' Busolt. Grlecb1.ebl

Stut'kun4,

C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchandlung, 1920), p. 421.
40nemosthene. xliv. 31.
4lDemoathenes xUi. 2.
42Demosthenea 1. 19-20.

(3d ed.# Munohen:
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feeling that their hearty celebration was likely to bring good luck •••43 The
festivals, tnsists George Grote, were intimately bound up with the national
SPirit.

44

But the subsequent idea that the Theone Fund was simply intended
by its proponents as a gratiftoation for the people must be avoided. It is our
firm contention that such was not the case. Perbaps the first scholar to break
from the "gratification" pattern was Henri Francotte. His views are worth

,

putting forth in some detall. For the Greets the state, he says, "raasemble a

une vaste lociete anonyme dont on se partage les bfSnef1cea ......45 The
soc1&l order in Athena amounteclto a primitive form of aoc1&l1am and must be
underatood in theae terms. f.Yetyone has a Dibt to an equal share in the
revenues of the ltate--SO the theory ran. 46 "Quant Ie eltoyen tend Ie matn,

,

~

l'Etat n'. pas davant lui un mencl1ant, quill paul Jatar • la porte, mals un

~3A. W. Pickard-cambridge, De_eMI

Mea the LasS pay, of

Greek Ftttclor-384.-32a B,g. (New Yonu G. P. Putnam's Sonl, 1914),
pp. 97-98.
""George Grote. History of
1856), ix, 492-99.

Cirtw

(ad

ed.: London: John Murray,

41Henri Franeotte, L'lQdultr1e dania b e Anc1enoe
(Brullell: Societe "lge de IJ.bratre, 1900-01), p. 49.

Yu".

46Iiemi Francotte, "Etude. lur DemOlthene: Demolthene et 1a
th8ortque,"
Belqt, XVJI (1913), 77.
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creancler qu'U dolt reoevoir avec les plus grands evarcls. 47 And.o the place
of the Theorlc Fund becomes olear:

,

,

Les dt.tr1buUons
compljta1ent
Ie .YStelae des .01de.: celul-ct
,
,
,
a ••urelt la remuneraUon de. service. rendus par Ie. cltoyens a
I' itat,
comme j~s, boWeutel, etc.; Ie tbeorique fourn1ssalt, des
,
re.source. awe cltoyens qui n'avatent pal rendu de services a l'Etat.
Les .olde. eta1ent Ie traitement de cewe qui., avalent falt quelque
chose; Ie th8or1que prooura1t un trattemeat a cawe qul n'avaient r1en
fait. AiDst 'tait maintenue I' eval1t. la plua complete de. cltoyens
devant Ie budget. 48
~

"..

The princtple of tht. Fund: "deux cho1e. par tite pour cheque jour non
"',
' ' ' ou awe trlbunawe. It 49 Francotte,
occupe" a 1a Hell
.. ou au eon.eU ou a'l'armee

as an economic histor1an at tbeturn of the twentieth century, 1. highly
cr1t1cal of luch cUstr1buUona; but he make. an 1mportant point,

,

,

A la cUstanoe ou nous lomma.,
l'.ppreciaUon de .emblable. inaUtu,
tiona e.t cltff1oUe. L'Etat n'eat nl une providence, n1 un ,endarme, U
ne noo. dolt pa. Ie viwe et Ie couvert; U noo. dolt plus que 1••imple
proteCUon de no. dro1t1 et de noa blens. n n'.st pal oharv' de faire
"
,
Ie bonheur de. individual U ne peut pal se desinteresler
de leur
malheur. eXt est Ie Juste mWeu? En bien des cal, U faut abandonner
aux c1rconstances, awe tracUtJ.onl de la nation Ie lOin de marquer.
, des Athenians
'"
aien de plus dangerewe done pour juger Ie IYlteme
que
de commencer par Ie replacer dana notre epoque. so
41J1WS. 78.
48:.DWl. 70-71.

49 Francotte , L' lQsIvfU1l ' •
50llUsL 43-44.

t

'

41.
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'We must, however, test this theory with great care, for upon it
depends our entire understanding of the Theone Fund in Athenian life. The
works of Demosthenes are above all an impcdant source in this regard. There
is, for example, the extremely compelling text in the

Fourth Phllippic 51 :

If we could banish from our midst both the obloquy which some heap on
the Theortc Fund, and alao the fear that the Fund will not be maintained
without doing a great deal of harm, we could not perform a greater serV1,ce nqr one more llkely to strengthen the whole body pol1tic ( O{\ flV
Tl1 V no>.. 1 v ).
Follow my argument whlle I state first the case of
those who are regarded as the poorer classes. There was a time not
long ago when the revenue of your state did not exceed a hundred and
thirty talents, and yet of those competent to undertake the trlerarohy
or pay the propert:)-tax there is not one that declined the duty that devolved on him in the absence of a surplus, but the war-gaUeys salled
out, and the money came in, and we did all that was required. Since
then fortune has smiled on us and increased our revenues, and the
exchequer now receives four hundred instead of one hundred talents,
though no property-Gwner suffers any los. but is rather the gainer,
for all the nch citizens come up to receive their share of this increase,
as indeed they bave a perfect right to do. What then do we mean by
reproaching one another for this and making it an excuse for doing

51That the Fourth Philippic is genuinely Demosthenlc can no
longer be reasonably questioned. Alfred lCoerte ("Zu Dldymos DemosthenesCommentar," Rh,ln1.ghe. MUleum fUr Phlloloq1e, Neue Foge, LX (1905),
388-416), Stephen Daltz (lithe Relationship of the De Cihersoneso and the
PhiUpp1ca Ouam of Demosthenes," Qlals1ca1 Philology. UI, No. 3 auly,
1957), 145-62), Werner Jaeger (Demolthen'l: Thm Origin and Growth of His
Policy, trans. Edward Robinson (Berkley: University of california Press, 1938),
p. 183), and lames Buchanan trheoQka
p. lOS) Join 'in asserUng its
authentic character, whUe Charles D. Adams ("Speeches vm and X of the Demosthentc Corpus, tI C1&"ictl Pblloloqy, XXXIII, No.2 (Apr., 1938),
129-44) baa made an important effort further to ground these statements.
!

••

,
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nothing, unless It Is that we grudge the relief which the poor have received at the hands of fortune? I for one shall not blame them, nor do
I think it fair to do.so.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• •• Just as each one of us has a parent, so ought we to regard the
collective citizens as the common parents of the whole State, and so
far from depriv1D9 them of anything that the State bestows, we ought,
if there were no such grant, to look elsewhere fOl' means to save any
of their wants from being overlooked. So then, if the wealthy would
accept this principle. I !hmk they would be dOing not only what is
fair, but also what is expedient; for to deprive one citizen of necessaries is to make many of them unite in disaffection towards the
government.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
For we are bound, Athenians, to share equitably with one another the
privileges of citizenship I the wealthy feeliD9 secure to lead their
own Uves and haunted by no fears on that account, but in the faoe of
dangers making over their property to the commonwealth for its defence; whUe the rest must realize that State-property 1s common
property, duly receiViD9 their share of it, but recognizing that private wealth belongs to the possessor. In thls way, a small state
grows great, and a great one is kept great. 5
The text 1s clear: Demosthenes explains both the nature of the Theorlc Fund
and 1ts foundations in prevalent political thecry. The Theone Fund, which all
share in, 1s a pubUc reUef measure for the poor (Pon Oe t a.

T',)l S

dn0f):":>t c;)

which the poor have a rtaht to receive. There Is also the somewhat earlier
520emosthenes x. 36-39; 41-42; 45.
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testimony of the Speech on OrpnizaUon t

The Theorlkon is not mentioned by

name In this speech. but the whole context of the speecb seems to point only
to this institution. There are allusions to ''the official. who assign and di....
tribute the public funds ". to "doles ", to fesUval. being a pretext fOf' doles.
etc., etc. 54 The speech concerns it.elf with a discussion taking place In the
Assembly over the allotment of a certain sum of money. The normal destiny of
this money would be the Theone Fund, but Demosthenes' purpose in speakin9
is to suggest an alternative and to use the occasion to discuss Athens'
general military preparedness. He begins by indicating po.sible modes of
treating

this problem of the sum of money:

I may attack the officials who assign and distribute the public fund.

and may thus galn credit with those who regard this system as detrimental to the State, Or I may approve and commend the right to receive
these d9,les and so ~at1fy th,ose who are esp.-c1ally !." need 9f them
(
~UTe aUV£'n~VTa xat xupatvEaav9
m~ bEt ~auBav£tv
Xa picru0'9at 1"o1S dCPaOp' ~V Xpc;{q., TOU AaB£tv o3'(J"tv )55
53The genuIne character of the Speech on OrganizaUon (xU!) has
been called into question at various times in the history of DeJllOsthenic
scholarship. This question cannot be explOf'ed in all Its detan here. It Is
enough to say that it 1. attested as being Demosthenic by Gustave Glotz
("Demosthene et les Finances Atheniennes de 346 It 339," Rtwe H1u9£1que,
CLXX (1932), 390.) and G. L. cawkwell ("Demosthenes and the StraUoUc
Fund, II Mnemosxno, Serles 4, XY (1962), 377.), whUe Werner Jaeger, though
having a few lingering doubts himself, attests that the modern verdlct 18 in
favor of it. genuineness. Confer Jaeger, Demostbenes: The Or1gin and growth
of His PolicY, 135.
54Demosthenes xU!. 1-3; 10.
55
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Mentioned in this text are the basic elements indicated in the Fourth
Philippic: a distribution of public funds as a particular aid to the poor. Later
Demosthenes indicates that the money distributed was not a return for service
rendered, but a dole in the strict sense. 56 In the Third Olynthiac, mention1.ng
the Theoric Fund by name, 57 Demosthenes speaks of public distributions,
though he expresses his opinion that these distributions do not, as they were
intended, cure the public ills: I'Like the diet prescribed by doctors, which
neither restores the strength of the patient nor allows him to succomb, so
these doles that you are now distributing neither suffice to ensure your safety
nor allow you to renounce them and try something else • • • ."
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Therefore,

from Demosthenes we have clear evidence that the Theorlc Fund was a means
of public assistance to the poor through distributions of public funds.

Aristotle also talks about the "two-obol dole. n Speaking from an
aristocratic point of view, Aristotle presents his theoretical position on this
practice:
56lQ!sL. 2.
57Demosthenes iii. 31.
58.1R!sl. 33. See also a similar passage in Demosthenes Proem.
53. 4.

I
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Now equality of property among the citiZen. i. certainly one of the
factors that contribute. to the avoidance of party faottcm.; it 1. not
however. part1cularly important one. Por the u,per cla •••• may res.m it on th. ground tlaat their IUI'lts . . not equal, owlDl to wlUch
wa actually s.e th•• often attacking the lovernment and rebelUng;
and also the bas.n•• s of human beings Is a thing insatiable, and
. \houG.,h at first a,dole of onlY,two obol. II enough (1'0 1t'pm-rov llev
nW.vt)v ~ l(l)PI).\' n [8 i cJ 1.1')V'1V ), yet when this has now beQome
an e.tebllahed custom, they alway. want mora, unW they ,et to all
unl1m1ted amount; for appetite Is in Itl nature unlimited, and the
majority of mankind 11vea for the .atiafaoUon of appetite. S9
Pollowing upon this, in look Six of the Poli"" he ,uts forth concrete propo,al.:
• • • whll. where ther. ar. revenue. men must not do what the popular
leaders do now (for they use the .urplu. for dol•• , and people no sooa..
,et them than they want the .... dolea ...tn, because th1a way of
helping the poor 1. the legendary Jar with a hole In it), but the truly
democratic .tate.man _st .tudy how the multitude may be saved fro•
• xtreme poveny, for this il what caus•• democracy to be comapt. • • •
the proper cour•• 18 to collect all the proceed. of the r.venues into a
fund and distribute thi. in lump sUIDa to the needy, best of all, if on.
can, in suma larg. enough for aCquJrlng • s.l1 .state, or, faWng Ws,
to serve as capital 1« trade or husbandry, and if thl, 18 not po"ible
for all, at aU events to distribute the 1D01IY by tribes or some oth..
dlvl810n of the' population In turn • • • •
It 1. clear enough that Ariatotl. 11 not cond.DlI1iRg the wantonnes. of the
Ath.JUan rabbI. whlGb bas its d.slres for bread. and c.trcus ev.. fWed by de.gogues lusting for power (so often this 18 th. lDterpretat10n
of hJ.s
,
59Arl.toU., Po11tic'

u .... 1167a31-b5, 11.

10~ vi. 3. 1320a29-b2. .. •

re_de.n,
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but clearly look.s upon these distributions as just relief for the poor. His only
point is that the system then in vogue (the Theoric Fund) does not do very well
the job for which it is intended. 61
A fair number of scholars have recognized that the Theoric Fund in

the time of Demosthenes is clearly not simply a matter of providing the poor
with theat.. seats, that it was of particular assistance to the poor in a more
substantial way. However, they seem unable to grant it any other role than
prOviding the poor With money for festal entertainment, a "little something II for
the poor to forget their troubles for a day. Glotz, for example, while
streSSing the rise of poverty in fourth-century Athens and the misery of the
poor, 62 and admitting that the Theodc Fund was an aid to the poor, nonetheles
classes the Theoricon as the means whereby the people could be assured of
'bread and circus and the egotistical impulses of the mob could be fulfilled. 63
II

61There is also a possible reference in IS similar vein in the
Antidosis of Isacrates: And 1£ I have refrained from accepting the bounties
b.tnllla-rmv ) which are distributed by the city it was because I thought it outrageous if I, who am able to maintain myself from my private resources, should
stand in the way of any of those who have been compelled to get their liveUhood from the city • • • • II (Iaocrates Antidosis 152). There may be bere
reference to the money paid for jury duty, another means of livelihood for the
unemployed poor.
II

62Gustave Glotz, The Greek City ang Its lnstitijtions. 312-13.
6~. 338-41.
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Grote, though trying to be understanding, classes the Theoric Fund as "almsgiving. 1.64 Wllamowitz wishes to link the fourth century Theoricon with the
idea embodied in the fifth century diobel1l, but is critical of such a measure
as an instrument fot' normal domestic policy. 65 Speaking of the Theoric Fund,
Arnold Schaefer rather bitterly states, "So weit allo war das Ubel mit dem
athentschen Wesen verwachsen, dass selbst Demosthenes darauf verzichtete
es mit dar Wurzel ausaurelasen: ein grosser Teil der Biirgerachaft konnte obne
Zuschusse aus Staatsmitteln nicht mehr bestehen. 1166 Most scholars have
grasped, at least 1n some embryonic fashion, that the Theoric Fund was a
measure for poor relief, though they have not, apparently, grasped the cooolusions that follow from this. Further, various forms of "anti-welfar1sm value
II

judgements present in these scholars tend to distort the very concept itself.
We are dealing here, of course, with a distribution of public
money. There was always the temptation for the people to distribute money
confiscated from private individuals among themselves. The Scholiast to
64 Grote , ix, 492-99.
65Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 212-16.
66Arnold Schaefer, Demolthenes und Seine ZeU (2d ed. rev.;
Leipzig: R. G. Teubner Verlag, 1886-7), II, 150.
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Aeschines makes reference to such propensities in the time of Cleophon. 67
And Demosthenes warns the people of his own time not to debase the Theonc
distributions by supplementing them by distributions of the wealth of private
persons, for all classe. of citizens must be treated Justly. Clearly, for
Demoathenes the Theoric Fund was a distribution of public money. 68
This public money was not one of the allotments in the budget, but
was made up of the surplus of revenues after the regular operating expenses of
government has been met. hl the Speech Against Nee.ra, dating probably
from 339 and def1nitely from the period of Demosthenes, 69 the speaker teUs
how that lover of legal haWes, ApoUodorus, brought forward a bill "proposing
that the people should decide whether the funds remaining over from the state's
expenditure

"
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military purposes or for theoric money (
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should be used for

Pickard-Cambridge ex-

plains:
67 Schol. Aeschinea 11. 76.
68Demosthenes x. 44-45.
69Por a discussion on the chronology and authenticity of the
BReech Against Ne,... see A. T. Murray (ed. and trans .), Demostilen,,: Pdyet! Orations L-LVIIII in Neaeram ("Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 347-49 and the reference given there.
70(Demosthenes) l1x. 4.
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• • • it would appear that at the beginning of each year, the Assembly
passed a Budget, allocating to special purposes and to particular funds
as much as was required by each; and that the surplus or unallocated
revenues passed in time of war into the mUitary chest, in time of peace
into the Theoric Fund, and that from the latter they were distributed to
the citizens.7 1

Later, the government financial expert, Eubulus, would have a law passed
making it mandatory that all the surpluses from the revenue go to the Theonc
Fund (c. 350). This law will be considered later in this chapter. It must be
held in mind that the Athenian state was unsophisticated in its financial arra.ngements. There does not seem to have been any general policy regarding
national finance. The. system was to vote a tax for a specifiC purpose and for
none other. If after there was a surplus in any of the treasuries, t.1ten it
would go, throughout most of the Demosthenlc period, automatically to the
71A• W. Pickard-Cambridge, 96-91.
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Theone Fund treasury to be returned to the people. 72
How much would the surpluses from the revenues amount to?
Here only conjecture can be offered. It 1s known from Demosthenes' Fourth
Philippic (x. 37-38) that when the revenues were 130 talents (after the Social
War in 356/55) there was no surplus and the state had difficulty making ends
meet, whUe when 400 talents was the annual revenue (by 341 at the latest) ,
there was a significant surplus. But !low much is not known. Frank Egleston
Robbins, in a study on the cost to Athens of her Second Empire, took up the
question of surpluses and offered the estimate that the amount would be from
between SO to 100 talents annually. He says, however, that there is not
72That the Tbeorlcon in the time of Demosthenes involved a distribution of the surpluses of the revenues is s'tj>ported by scholarly opinion.
Busolt condemns it for swallowing up Malle Uberschusse der Staatsverwaltung"
(Busolt, 427). Schwahn (IITheorikon, " Pauly- Wissowa) likewise holds this
view as does Gustave Gilbert <Th. Constitutional Antiquities of Barta and
Athens, trans. E. J. Brooks and T. Nicklin from the 2d German ed. (London:
Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 189S),
.. pp., 342-43.). While ancient sourc.s do
not often talk of the surpluses (-ra 1(£ p \ ov-ra ) by name--though Demosthenes
x. 37-38 does seem to link the surpluses specifically with the Theono Fund-there are very many references to a divic:l1Qg
, of the public money. Confer
Justin vi. 9., Harpooratton ~.v. e£Wp'Ka , Libanius Argumenta Qraijonum
Demosthen1carum: Hvpoth. 01 t 1. 7-11 ., Sohol. Demosth,enea I. 9. 1., etc.
There is no room for a view such as Kahrstedt's (Nachrichten •• , « 1929,
160-61 .) that the Theoricon in the Ume of Demosthenes was stUI the very
small matter of providing money for the theater.
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enough data to do anything more than offer conjecture .13 But during the
Demosthen1o period the loss of territories particularly in the northern Aegean
area would have lowered the oontributions of the allies and thus would have
reduced in all probability the average minimum surplus and qu1.te possibly the
average maximum. On this basis it seems better to accept an annual average
of between 20 and 90 talents, realizing that in any given year the amount
could be less (even nothing) or more .14
Much is learned about the mode of distribution of the Thaoric Fund
from one section of the Speech Against Leochares:
He got together some of the Otrynians with the demarch, and persuaded them at the opening of the adult register to inscribe his name.
13Frank Egleston Robbins, "The Cost to Athens of Her Second
Empire," ClassiCll Pb1lology, XIII, No.4 (Oct., 1918), 388.
14The argument will often be levelled that distributing the surpluses harmed Athens· military preparedness. Certainly it can be admitted that
the surpluses represented an additional possible source of money for state pr0Jects, including defense. But that such distributions really hurt Athenian defense is less sure. The mass of people did not feel so, obviously. Tbere is
also an interesting passage found in the speech by Demosthenes On th§
False LegaUon (xix. 89-91). Demosthene. suggests that Aeschines will say
in his defense that during the Peace of Pbilocrates (Which Aeschines promoted)
Athens has a strong fleet of three hundred warships with money for them.
Demosthenes does not answer that this is a lie because there is no money but
rather that this would have been the case, peace or no peace. Both Aesoblnes
and Demosthenes in effect indicate that peace does not mean the end of funds
for defense.
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A . .d after that on the occasion of the great Panathenaea at the time of
the distribution, he oame to get his Theorio money (:rtpo S '-0 gec.op \ KOV),

and when the other demesmen were reoeiving it, he demanded that it be
given him also, and that he should be entered on the register under the
name of Arohiades. But when we entered a solemn protest, and all t.."1e
others deolared that what he was doing was an outrage, he went away
Without either havin9 his name insoribed or reoeiving the Theorio money

(,.0

eeroptK0V AaFruv).7 5

From this it is olear that to get the Theonc money a citizen had to appear be-

fore an official of his deme and reoeive his money. 76 A man had to be a full
oitizen to reoeive his money. Besides the evidence of the above text on this
point, Lucian in his T1mgn seems to make the same point: "When reoently he
had the assignment of distributing the Theoricon to the tribe of the
Ereohtheidae, I came to ask for what was mine, but he said he did not reoognize me as being a citizen ... 77 And a citizen had to appear in person, Conon
75Demosthenes xliv. 37.
76This is also in the opinion of several scholars, attested in a
text from Plautus:
(Eucl1o, a gentleman of Athens, apparently has a pot of gold in
his house. But he will have to go out to get his money or others
will think he has a stock of his own.)
nam noster nostrae qui est magister ouriae
dividers argenti dixit nU:l!mos in viros;
id si rel1nquo ac non peto, omnes i1100
me suspioentur, credo, habere aurum dom!.
(Aulularta, 101-10)
71 Luctan Vmon 49 •
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of PaMnia on one occasion was proseouted fer bavtng taken Theorto money fer

bi. son who was abroad. 78
There is now the problem of det.mlning the amount paid out in thi.
Fund. The Fund seems to have been associated in the minds of people with the
term

'~

obols." Demosthenes, for example, in the SptA

on OmanIMti@

says: "It Is that tboUOb the many reforms proposed were all of the. tJnpcnant
and bonourable, no one remembers any of them, but everyone remembers the
two obols. fl79 In the context, which, a. has been 1nd1cated, 18 only explatnable in terms of the pubUc distributions of the Tbeoric Fund, ''two obols"
seems to be a synonym for the Fund. However, in none of the later speeches
of Demosthenes nor in any speech of Mschine. do we find the Theorto Fund

referred to in this manner. In a text already oited from Aristotle, we have the
(not

) .80 .Again, given the general oon-

text, the reference seems to be anotb. synonym for the Theoric Fund. It must
be recalled that the early Theorio Fund was always a matter of two obols (a
thing made olear in innumerable texts). It I. l1kely that the late Theor1c Fund

78Hypereid•• lMmlt Demoathg.s Frag. 6 (1).
79Demoatben.s xW. 10.
80Aristotte Pol1t1g1 11. 4. 1267b2. 11.
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remained associated for a time with this term, but becauae it became considerably more than a Theater Fund under the management of Eubulus, the "two
obol" appellation was less and less suitable. The SRUCh on Orun1lation was
delivered 0.352-50 when the revenue. were aWl somewhat low, and a larve
surplus clid not exist. Two obols per festival may have been the regular payment. But the usage in ArUtotle may well point to a traclitional term, despite
the absence of this term in the orators.
In the time of Demo.thenea evidence exists for large sums being

distrtbuted. Conon of Paeanta attempted to get five drachmas for his son, 81
and this seems to have been a single allowance if the reference in D1narchus
is to the same incident. 82 And Plutarch associates Demades with a 50 drachma
clistr1bution for the Anthester1a c. 330. 83 But the amount mentioned 1s so large
that e1ther Plutarch exaggerates or this was a most untyplcal d1stribution. To
make suoh a clistrtbutton on tb1a one occa.lon 1 SO talent. would have been faqu1red (baaed on 18,000 potential recipients). The f19ure of a drachma 1s

.om.time. given (e.g. in the Schol1on to Luoian's Timon, 49), but this may
81 Hypereld.s Aga1nst I2emolthta., Frag. 8 (7).
8201narchus Against Demostbene' 56.

83plutarch Praectpta Gerenae R!1publlcae 25. 1. 818 E-F.
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refer to the total sum given under the early rheor1con for the three-day City
D10nysia. However, the reference 1n He,ychiul to a drachma may be f« a
single allowanoe. 84 We f1nd better help on this quest10n in a statement in the
Machines Schol1on:
The Athenians distributed as rheoric money a drachma at first to each
citlzen, a praattce introduced by Pericles. Later, under the pretext of
the rheor1c Fund, muoh money was dlatrtbuted at the same Ume. '1'b11
took place at the time of Diopbantus and also at the time of Eubulus. 5
The important words here are "much money at the same Ume

,
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)-addit1onal evidence for larver distributions in the Ume of

Demoathenes .86 Clearly, though. to determine the amount given out on any
single occasion is impossible Simply on the basis of this data.
It wtll pi'ove helpful to tackle thla problem in a different manner.
We have seen that the Theor1c Fund was distributed on the festivals. It Is
furth.. known that Athens had from between twenty-two and thirty festivals a

84Hesych1us Lg1gon s. v. Opaxun XUAa.tCOO'U.
85Schol • AeKl\1at1 111. 24.

86References to three obols, four obols, and one draQhma are
also found (Lucian EQpom1um Demosthen!. 36, (Demosthenea) ProtJJ)1um 53.
4.) but it 1. by no means certain that the.e ere actually reference. to the
Theonc Fund.
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year, some of which ran for several days. 87 A lump sum would be distributeci
on at least a number of the.e festival days. Now it la certain thet We lump
sum did not represent an amount given for each day of the year. For if two
obols were given on eaob day of the year, the cost of the program would be
about 400 talenta per y..,.....n Impossibly h19h amount. a.sides, it Is known
from the ConstituUo.n 01 &hI Atben.1.an' that there was a dally two obo1 payment
by the .tate to invaUd.:

The Council also examine. the invalids. 'or there is a lew whJ.ch orders
that those whose property 1. le.s then three minae and who are so completely di.abled phys1cally that they cannot do any work .hall, after
having been· examined by the Council, receive two obo!s daily for their
support from the public funds .88

If there were a dally welfare payment of two obols to everyone, the invalids
would certainly not berequJred to undergo a spectal examination by the
Council, But on the oth« hand, it 1. impossible to accept the position that
87The chief Athenian festival. beg1nn1ng with those in the fir.t
month of the Athenian year (late July/Aug.) were the following: G-onia,
Synoika, Panethenaea, Boedromta, Pyanops1a, Osohophoria, Thesmophorta ,
Apeturla, Olalkeia, Haloa, Rural DionysJa, Gamelia, Lenaia, Anthe.teria,
Chloia, City Diony.1a, Munyob1a, Thargelta, Plynter1a, Sk1rophoria, Dlpholta t
and Arretophoria • There wa. also the fesUval of the Eleusinian Myster1es as
well as a number of smaller festal days. Of all the.e fe.tivals, the
'anatheneea and the City Dionysia were by far the IDOst important.
88Aristotle AtIlt Pgl. 49. ".
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the distribution was a mere matter of two obols bein9 given out pwhaps
fifteen times a year, as Kahratedt 89 and A. H. M. Jones 90 hold. Por no one
would propose to finance milltary expeditions with only fifteen or sixteen
talents. This would make not only Demosthenes look quite foolish for having
made such proposals but a180 the Athenian people for letting Eubulus sway the
so easily at the time of the Peace of Philocrates.
But the main problem with both such proposals is that they _nore
the flexible character of the surpluses. After the SOCial War when Athens had
paid out 1000 talents fer

Dl8rCei1ary

loldiers alone,91 Athenl was forced to

scrimp and save to make ends meet. There was nothing like a lurplus then.
But by 345 or so the revenue had risen to 400 talents a year and there was a
si9nJflcant surplus. TIli. challge in surpluses, says G. L.

~wkwell,

"can

also be seen from Demoathenes' financial proposals in 3S1 and 349-in 351 be
did not talk about the TIl.eric Fund because it no doubt was insignificant; in
349 it was conSidered large enough to finance a military expedition. 92 In a
89 K'ahrstedt, Naabricbten • , ., 1929. 159-60.
90A. H. M. Jones, Atheni§n DeI)9CDCV (Oxfon:t: Ba.ll Blackwell,
19$7), pp. 33-34.
91Isocratea k!ORA5l1t1cu. 9.
92G. L. ~wkwel1, IQ\.llDll of Hlll"mic Studt!., LXXXID, 62.
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good year a hundred or more talents would be available to distribute; in a very
bad year nothing. The average range of the surpluses, as has been said, probably ran from 20-90 talents. Let us assume, with Boeckb,93 that 18,000
citizens would receive payments. If the average payment during the year was a
drachma on each distribution day, payment might be made on twenty-five fesU-

val days, costing the state 75 talents for the year. If the average payment
equalled 5 dr. per festival day, only six distributions oould be made U 90
talents were available for the Fund. If two obols were paId out, each dlstrtbution day would cost the state one talent. If paid out on all the 25-30 festivals
dur1ng the year, the Fund would expend 25 to 30 talents, an amount which
would be doubled or tripled during a period of prosperity. Such seems to be
the most reasonable estimates that can be offered. It may have been that there
was a certain m1nimum amount alloted, as earUer, for the theater seats. but
evidence for or against this possibility ia absent.
This distribution of the surpluses was administered by a special
Theone Board. That there was such a board is clear from Alb. Pol. 43. 1,
93Augustus Boeckh, 'lbe Publ1p Economy of the Athenians, trans.
Anthony Lamb from the 2d German ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,' 1851) ,
pp. 310-11. This range of figures is alao accepted by Buchanan (theor1ka ' • ,
141), who himself oites Boeckh, by van Ooteghem (Les Etudea Oleaatguea, I,
405) and by Andreades (History of Greek Publio Finlnoe, 262).
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Alb, Pol. 47. 2, Aeschines 11i. 25, and Demosthenes Qn the 9'gwn 113.

The usual term used to designate this Board,

0 t'

l T( \ 1'0 e€ (l)P n(:~, indicates

that there were more than one man on this Board. How many members cannot
be ascertained. As for the manner of selecting these officials, the following

appears in the ConsUtut1oD

of the Atheni!ns:

All the officials for the orcUnary administration are chosen by lot, With
the exception of the Treasurer of the military funds, the Treasurers of
the Theoric Fund, and the Superintendent of the water supply. Theae
latter officials are elected by vote and hold their officI! from on_
Panathenaic festival to the next (l'K Ila. vae l1va'(l)V € Cs flavael1Vala).94
Does this refer to the Greater Panathenaea? Schwahn, for one, seems to think
that it does and that, therefore, the Board members held four-year term•• 95
But Busolt96 holds that a man held office only from one year to the next (from
one lesser Panathenaea, that Is, to the next), as does Ferguson. 97 The
Greek, which leaves out the adjective

-

lloEXa.NJry

,

bears out the latter inter-

pcetation. But though a man only held office for a year at a time, it seell1s pro94Aristotle Atb t Pol. 43. 1.
9SSchwahn t "Theorika," PAuly-Wissowa.
96Susolt, 1143-44.
97WUliam Scott Ferguson, Hellenistic Athen, (London:
MacmUlan and Co., 1911), pp. 413-15.
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bable that men Uke Eubulus and Lycurgus either were repeatedly elected or that
they controlled the policies of the Board through theJr political friends. 98 Probably the very fact that the Tbeorio Board officials were elected instead of
chosen by lot meant that they could be re-elected--deslgnation by lot was used
to insure new people being chosen eaoh year.
The authority of the Theonc Board was not simply a matter of
supervising the distribution of money several times a year. Aeschines tells us:
In earlier times, fellow oitizens, the city used to elect a Comptroller of
the Treasury, who every prytany made to the people a report of the

revenues. But because of the trust which you placed in Eubulus, those
who were elected Superintendents of the Theone Fund held (unttl the law
of Hegemon99 was passed) the office of Comptroller of the Treasury and
the office of Receiver of Moneys; they also controlled the dockyards, had
charge of the naval arsenal that was building, and were superintendents
of stre,tc& almost the whole admlnistra1tm of the state was in their
hands.
On this passage the SchoUast makes a noteworthy oomment. He suggests that

Aesehines says this to destroy in advance a possible argument of Demosthenes:
Lest Demosthenes might say that 'thus we were well-minded toward the
city; it entrusted many offices to me', he [Aeschinetil destroys this ar98Aeschines 11i. 25. 1s strong proof for the power of Eubulus.
99The law of Hegemon, passed after 338 as an anti-Demosthenes
measure--Hegemon was a supporter of Eubulus, Aeschlnes, etc. (of •
Demosthenes xvUi. 28S)--restored the independent office of Comptroller
(dv-nypaq€u s ).

IOOAeachines 111. 25.
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gument saying that this was done not on account of Demosthenes' good
will, but because this was the custom from the time of E~bulus. From
that time forth this custom held even for the unworthy. 1 0
So from the time of Eubulus these different functions seem to have been bound
up with the office of the Theoric Board. Pollux also links the Theonc Board
with the selling of possessions of those exiled by the Court of the Areopagus
and with the selling of booty .102 These functions are, of course, easy to
link with the basic task of distributing the surpluses.

But what of the overseeing of civic construction projects which the
Board did? G. L. Cawkwell made an effort to deal with this problem. "There
is no reason," he says, "to suppose that the Commission controlled no more
than it distributed./ll03 Besides citing the passage from Ae.chines given
above, he points out that Harpocration, s. v.
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1 04 There is also the fact,

lOlSchol. Aeschine, 111. 25.
l02pollux Qnomasticon viii. 99.
103G. L. Gawkwell, Journal of Hellenic Studies, LXXXIII, 56.
For his complete discussion cf. pp. 53-57.
104Harpoc:ret1on Lexicon in Decem Oratore. Atticos s.v.
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recorded in Phllochorus, that when the Athenians voted that the Theoric money
be made available for military purposes

(,..a

Xpnlla-ra Ivn'PicravTO

nav,..·E 7va

, work was also suspended on the ship sheds and the naval
arsenal. 105 It is known, further, from an inscription that Eubulus purchased
wood for naval work:
EN TEL APXA.IAI l;l{ (::.: )Y08iUCl:I
NEI.>. :tAIN.h.: A~(r)

ON

EYBOYi\O~

6;.,P (IA )TO

Dinarchus teUs us that Eubulus had many ships and new dockyards built, 107
and his statement is supported by the fact that the number of ships in the
Athenian navy increased from 288 in 357/6 to 341 in 353/2 to 392 In 330/29.108
Demosthenes also gives evidence for this linkage of public works with the
Theorlc Fund:
'But,' says an objector, lif our foreign policy has faUed, there is great
improvement in domestic affairs.' And to what can you pOint In proof?
105Philochorus, frag. 135.
106& U2 1627. 352-54.
107Dlnarchus Against Demosthenes 96.

lOaMi I12 1611. 9.; 1613. 302.; 1627. 269.
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To the walls we are whitewashing, the streets we are paving, the water
works, and the balderdash?
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Now I on the contrary I the politicians hold the purse-strinqs and manage
everything (Kat Ota. -rOU-rON a:n:uv-ra 1fpci-rn;-ral), whUeyou, the
people, • • • have sunk to the level of lackeys and hanqers-on, content
if the politicians gratify you with a dole from the Theoric Fund (lcraO 1000
Gemp t ){(i5v ) or a procession at the Boedromia • • • • 109
Indeed Eubulus seems to have attempted to achieve this financial goal of the
writer of the Treatise on the Revenues;
• • • if with a large surplus in hand we shall celebrate our festivals with
even more splendour than at present, shall restore the temples, and repair the walls and docks ••• surely, I sali' our proper course is to
proceed with this scheme forthwith • • • • 10

All points to this combininq of function by the Theoric Board from the time of
Eubulus on.
109Demosthenes iii. 29, 31. This passage is a virtual repetition
of that found in Demosthenes xiii. 30.
110 (Xenophon) Treatise on the R!yenues 6. 1. The Greek of this
passage indicates the relationship of the surpluses, the festivals, and the
construction programs: . . . . . 71ePtOuatas OE noAA.1;s YEvollivf)S ll£Ya..A.oTCPETCia-rEpov
ll£V ~-rt
vuv , eOP'iQ',) ~~Oll£V, t'Epa 0 'lntO'}{EuacrollEv,
,
"
....,
-re t Xf) OE ){Q." VE(J)P t a. vOpGCOO'OUEV
. • •• " The treatise
On the Revenues, produced, it is bel1eved~ shortly after 3SS, is often held to
be tile quiding theoretical position of the party of Eubulus. For the basic program of the writer is to make Athens secure by placing her on a sound financial
ba8is--somethlng much needed in the period immediately after the Social War •

i.

S3

It has been said that the Theoric Board attained this power simply
because of the prestige of Eubulus .111 But, while this no doubt had its effect
on the minds of the people, it is also true that public works projects, which
certainly would provide work for the poor, on this basis complement well the
publ1c-welfare-distribution function of the Board.
Cawkwell himself does not agree that there were distributions of
money on any scale, but wants to make public works the chief reason for the
importance of the Board. But, not to menUon again all the previous evidence
for distributions which has been given, in one of the very sources he Cites, we
find that Harpocration links the Theoricon with distrIbutions for the people

(~tavop.as

-rffiv 1TOAt-rOSV) .112 His eVidenoe, though, for linking public works

with the Theorio Board seems sound, and it can be assumed that because publio
works were a means of giving employment to the poor, the Theorlc Board was a
logIcal agency to oversee them. In this case, "Theoric Fund would have
II

analogous meanings: one referring to the Tbeoric Fund proper, the distribuUon
of money; another referring to all.:the money given to the Theoric l30ard for its
III Schaefer., II, 301.

l12Cited thus in G. L. cawkwell, Journal of Hellenic Studie"
LXXXIII, 57.

.
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expenses. It may be that money was actually budgeted for the public works
projects (probably so, in some cases), though perhaps part of the surplus went
for public works, part for distributions.
The distributions of Theor1c money was governed during the period
of Demosthenes by a aeries of laws. These laws (at least those known to us)
revolve around the relationship of the Theor1c Fund to the military fund
(O'1"pa,{"t(.l)1"l}(a

).

Ther.is no clear mention of a War Fund as such

in

the

existing documents before 348 in the Olynthllcs of Demoath.nes. The existenc., however, of some such fund may be indicated in texts ten years earlier
or more. In the Speech Mainst Timotheus (362) the phrase
1"tKffiv xpml:a1"ON

occurs twice. 113 Th. adjectival use of

lK '{"mv O'1"pa1"t(.l)-

O'1"pa1"I('o1"l'KmV

does not, however, in 1tself point to a specifiC Fund. There is also a referenc
in the Speech Against Polvel.s (359) to persons who collect the military funds
(or supplies?); the Greek reads

'{"rov 1"a O'1"pa1" t (.01" t Kcl E l O'rcpa,{,,1"ov1"m~

.114

There is also the later evidence 1n the Schollast to Demosthenes for a War
Fund prior to the Theoric Fund but the chronology in the passage is
l13Demosthenes xlix. 12, 16.
114Demosthenes 1. 10.
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obscured .115

HarpocraUon' s statement is clearer, 116 but it may mean only

that there were funds f« military purposes (as L1banius puts it117). Such a
Fund, if it did exist, would administer the '1sohorae levied for war purposes
and the surpluses of the revenue if, indeed, they were assigned to this purpose
In the Snp Against Nea.![I there Is the statement l&'uat

,•••• the laws prescribed that, when there was wer, the funds remaining over
from state expenditures should be devoted to a,-p a,-, wTlxa • • • • .. 118 This
of course would mean that the money would not be given to the Theorlc Fund.
The speaker refers to the period before the Olynthus crisis (1.e. before 349/8).
If there was such a Fund, there may well have been such a law. Of oourse,

from the period of the Soclal War until about 353 there would have been no sur115 "Seeing that they had a military fund, the Athenians a little
before had made this money Theorlc money, so that each of the citizens got
two obols on the day of the theatrical presentation that they might use the
one for their own sustenance and might have the other to give to the directorin-chief of the theater. II Sgbol. Demo,thenea i. 9. 1. This passage probably
confuses the early Theor1con with the late fund.
116''ThiS money formerly was kept
, for the necessities of war and
was called the Military Fund (O'TpaTt mTO(a ), but later it was turned over for
public projects and distributions
, •••• " HarpocraUon L!xicon in Decem
Orator.s Attico! s. v. e€ we ll< a •
117 Libanlus .Arcmmlnt;! Oro1&onum Dtmosthenicarum: Hypoth. 01. L
7-11.
118 (Demosthenes) lix. 4.
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pluses. The people would not debate whether non-existent funds should be
assigned to the War Fund or the Theor1c Fund.
But the speaker in the §peegh Against Neaer; is not entirely
truthful. There may well have been such a law. but at the Ume in question it

had been superseded by a new law, sponsored by Eubulus apparently, which
assigned all the surplus money to the Theorie Fund. When was this new law
brought into effect? If, suggests Prancotte, there was a law which assigned
the surplus in time of war to the War Fund, it does not seem to have been
operative in 352, the approximate date of the Speeob on Omanizat1on, for
Demosthenes does not appeal to the people to follow this law in connection
with the ,lIsmall sum of money" under discussion. Likewise, if the new law of
Eubulus were in effect, there would not have been this discussion. 119
However, shortly thereafter Eubulus must have put in his law for by 349
Demosthenes was hesitating to move that the surpluses be used for military
purposes,120 and in the Third Olynthiac he calls upon the people to appoint
nomothetes to repeal the laws for the administration of the Theone Fund which,
in his words, "distribute the military funds as Theorlc money among those who
119 Prancotte, Musee Beige,
12°Demosthenes 1. 19-20.

xvn,

15.
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re_in 1n the city ... 121
What did th.s. laws provide? P1ckard-Cembrtdge suggests the
following:
It 1. moat lJkel., that the law put an." to th••• signment of unallocated
funds (whether fOf' m1l1tary « oth.r purpoa••) by means 01. decr••1 of the
Peopl., and that 1t cUd 10 simply by eMoting that all funds not allocated
in the annual Budl- 1Ilou1d become tHCIIf1c BlOI\8YJ for no deere. m19bt
contravene a law, Oft pain of penalt1e1 wbJ.cb m19ht be very heavy, aad
In order to pa.1 any lpeel.1 vote of BlOW: out of the surplus it would be
naces...,. to repeal tile law 01. EubulUI. 2
'lh... II the beltef that the•• law. nqWred the death penalty for

whoever would att.mpt to have the Iurp1U••' _d. over to military 1.1. . . . .
hlOlt, for example, aayl, . . . . . bald darauf Cawt.Gh.n 343 UDd 339) durall
.in ZUsatat••eta derjellJ4r., dar beelltreVeD lollte di. i)ccnp Pea &1.1 aTpaT'- . , .
(01' t }{

cl

au machen, JIllt d.. rode ••traf. becIrobt ...123 Tbl1 Is held allo by

Arnold Schaefer

124

and leeg.. , 125 Th. only enotent te.timony for thi. law,

121 Demolthenes ill. 10-11.
122plckard-Cambrtdge, 127.,
123ausolt, 1143.
1248 ohaefer, U, 145.
125,aeger , 244.
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however, is found in Libanius 126 and the Schol1a to Demosthenes, 12 7 both of
whom simply state the fact that there was such a law. But it is not likely that
there was such a penalty. The simple law of Eubulus worked very well to deter
those who would make such a chang-e; Apollodorus, after all, was convicted
and fined, and no other attempt to make this change is known of until 339
when, presumably, the legal obstacles were cleared away. The testimony of
the Schol1ast and of Lihantua, both from the third and fourth centuries A. D • , by

itself is not compelling • Cawkwell in this connection points out that the
Schollast was not free from error, for he says that the war with Philip began in
349/8 and that the motion of Apollodorus preceded the 0lYntbiacI, both of
which, Cawkwell states, are demonstrably false. 128 Along with Cawkwell in
opposition to the existence of this law stand Pickard-Cambridge, 129 Holm,130
126L1banlus Argumenta Orat1onum DemostheniClrum: HY1?9th. 01.

1.. 7-11.
127 Schol. DemolShenes I. 9. 1.
128G. L. Cawkwell,

I9urna1of

Hellenic Studt,s, LXXXIII, 59.

129Pickard-Cambricige, 127.
130Adolf Holm, Hiltary of Greeqe (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1896), nI, 224.

S9

and Navarr:e. 131 all of whom believe that these writers ex8qqerate the
t

meaning of u 'fi

,

t

_...

,

up.mv ano At 0' ea. I

in Demosthenes Third Olynthiac, 12,

taking it literally instead of figuratively.
In early' 348 occurred the only case known when anyone tried to

circumvent the law of Eubulus. ApollodoNs, when the city was "on the point
of sending out its entire force to Euboee and Olynthus II (Phocion was sent out

to quell the rebellion in Euboea early in 348 and soon after called for all the
help he could get from Athens), seeing, perhaps, that Demosthenes had
achieved nothing with regard to finances by his Olvnthiacs (all of which date
from 349) and also by the fact that Phaeion's expedition to Euboea was taking
much longer than expected and therefore cost a good deal, moved "that the
people ought to have power to do what they pleased" with the surpluses. At
the time, because of the pinched financial situation, the people approved.
But later Stephanus, a personal enemy whom Apollodorus previously had indlcec
for perjury, indicted the decree as Ulegal and won his case, so the author of
the §peech MaiD" NUerA would have us believe, by makIng the people beHeve that Apollodorus was a state debtor. Apollodorus was fined a talent for
131 0. Navarre, "The6rikon, Thedrtka," Dictionnaire des
Antiguites Grecgues et Romaines, ed. Edmond 8aglio, V, 206-08.
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making an Wegal motion .132 Bowever, it Is unl1kely that Apollodorus was
convicted on this technicality, for no one else subsequently made a s1m1lar
motion. Cawkwell suggests that the motion was at first well received because Phocton's army was in Buboea fer so long .133 But because the impl1caUons fer the Theone Fund were no olear, the people subsequently rejected the
moUon. Obviously, there was soUd legal proteot1on fer the TIleorlc Fund.

In 339/8, PhJlocharus reports, .. • • • the public money was aU

voted fer the war fund, Demosthene, mak1n.g the moUon."l34 Clearly
Demo,thenes did this in a lepl falhion by ftrst removing the old law of
Eubuius. Fer if he had not, Mschines and the other foes of Demosthenes
would certainly have menUoned this as another instance of Demosthenes' depravity. In the period 340-39, the Athenian state was in great turmoil because
of the renewed confUct with Philip. The people were ready for any measure to

insure their safety .. The Fund, however, was restored shortly after 338.
Such Is the general picture of the Tbeor1c Fund. It was a distribution of the surpluses from the revenues distributed on fesUval days to citizens
132 (Demoathenea) I1x. 3-8.
133a . L. CawkweU, JOurnal
134Phllocborus, frag.. 13S ..

of

1.11,* SlUcijes

«

LXXXlII, 62-63.

....
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thrOugh their demes • It

~ded

for some of the needs of the poor, though aU

were eligible to receive it. The wealthy, however, paid the greater part of the
taxes from wb1ch the revenues were derived whUe the poor, because of their
numbers, collected most of the Theor1c money. This distributions were
governed by. Theone Board, which also had control over another important
measure of relief for the poor, public work.. Eubulus considered the n.ecxtc
Fund of .uch importance for hi. policies that he had .pecial laws enacted to
preserve its existence. But the s'trOllge.t preservative fCll'C8 for the Fund was
the tradition built up in the Greek world that the wealth of the state beloll9s to
aU the members of the state.

CHAPTER

m

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE THEORIC FUND

To say sImply that the Theorlc Fund was a relief payment of suchand-such an amount gIven out to all the people on the festival days is not
enough. The Theorlc distributions existed in a very definite mUieu and themselves helped to form and reform this milieu. It Is essential, therefore, to
grasp this larger context.
Changes in the oost of living which took place over the course of
the fourth century are instructive and give one indication why the Theortc Fund
a ••umed a greater importance. 1 In the fifth century the usual dally Willie for
the workman was one drachma. A9r1cultural workers also received about one
dr. In the fourth century W&ges by the day tended to rise and to vary. Un-

skilled laborers averaged about 1 1/2 dr. per day, whUe, according to the
Eleusln.tan account., skilled craftsmen received about 2 or 2 1/2 dr. Workers,
1Statistics on wages and prices taken from A. H. M. Jones
(Athen1an Dtmocncy (Oxford: Basil Blaokwell, 1957), p. 135.) and Gustave
Glatz <Ancient Greeqe It WqrJs: An Economio Hl.tOD! of Greecl, trans. M. R.
Dobie (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), pp. 237-38; 285-87).
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of course, did not work every day, for there were many festivals and holidays
and there were also slack periods and lay-offs. There was, however, a tendency to base wage scales DlOre and more on the piece rather than by the day.
We may estimate on the basie of these figures that in the fourth century the
average annual wage for the unskilled worker was. about 450 dr. whereas the
skilled workman drew from 600-150 dr. Thus from the fifth to the fourth century wages virtually doubled.

What of prices? The price on wheat (per mediumus) rose from an
average of 2 dr. in the fifth century to 3 and then 5 dr. in the fourth century.
/

It must, of courae, be remembered that in Umes of scarcity the price would go
to four or even six Umes that amount. Oxen for sacrifice cost 51 dr. a head aa
an average in 410 and 11 1/4 dr. about 315 with the price being presumably
higher later in the century. The price of copper at least doubled over the hundred year period. There was, however, only a. slow rise in the price of raw
iron until about 330. The

himation (outer garment), plain quaUty, cost 16 dr.

in 392, but in 329 the wbgleMI' price for the commonest quality garment was
18 1/2 dr. Thia would incl1cate a fairly serioua rise on the retail market.
Between 380 and c. 340 ox hides for making shoes appear to have doubled in
price. Clothing in general appears to have been expensive. From this it
would appear that prices generally doubled during the course of the fourth

If
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century.
It is now apparent who was caught in the wage-price squeeze.
The unskilled worker, who had averaged about a drachma per day in the fifth
century, now was earning only 50 CK, better than that in the fourth (though he
may have been able to improve his situation by working more often, at least
in some cases). The skilled worker, however, could meet the rising prices be-

cause hts wages were 100-lSOCK, higher than in the fifth century.
The result of this was that the number of poor in the Athenian state
was very high. The number of citiZens in Athens during the Demosthenic
period was no greater than 25,000 and perhaps closer to the 21,000 indicated
in the census of Demetrius of Phalerum of 322. 2 Out of this number only 1200,
Demosthenes tells us, had estates larve en0U9h to bear a trierarchy (which
would cost between 40 minae and a talent) • 3 In 322 only 9,000 oitizens
poss.ssed an estate even of the low value of 20 minee (2,000 dr.). 4 A. H. M.
Jones believes that of the 12, 000 citizens below this figure (which might ra2F1gure cited in A. W. Pickard-cambridge, Demo.t;hene,and the
LIst Day, of Greek Fr!edom--384 ... 323
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1914), p. 71.

,.e.

3Demosthenes xiv. 16.
4Pickard-Cembrldge, 71.
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present, say, a holdtng of five acres with house and livestock), 5,000 probably owned no land at all. Some of these might be fairly well off, but very
many of the unskilled laborers probably were in this lower echelon on the
economic scale.

5

It may be as.umed that perhaps one-fifth of the citiZens in

the .tat. lived in a more or le.s significant state of poverty. Inde8d, said
I.acrates (no doubt exaggerating somewhat),

II

•

•

•

today those who are desti-

tute of means outnumber those who po••••• them ... 6 "There would be in .uch II
.ituation a n.ed for .tate assi.tanc•• It .eems likely that the Theor1con was
cho.en as one of the means to give this asslstance--a limited mean., no
doubt, but an aid.
Certain of these economic facts have definite consequ.nces in the
political order. Having se.n several of the bastc features of the economic order, we may under.tand the central prinoiples of the socio-political order.
Here .nare awaits the unwary inv.stigator--preJudtce. This is operative on
two levels. Fir.t, it Is quite .. sy to make value judgments in terms of modem
practice, rather than in terms of what Ath.nian life and thought was
SJones, 79-81'.
'Isacrat.s AreoPlQtt1cYS 83.
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11ke. 7 Francotte's warnJ.ng with regard to the Theoric Fund has already been
presented. But current historical practice and a certain cosmopolitanism of
twentieth century Uving minimizes this problem. More likely, the Greeks
themselves can fool us. A. H. M. 10nes makes this interesting point:
It is curious that in the abundant literature produced in. the
greatest democracy of Greece there survives no statement of democratic
political theory. All the Athen.ian political philosophers and publiCists
whose works we possess were in various degree. oligarchic in sympathy.
The author of the pamphlet on the 'Constitution of the Athenians' preserved among Xenophonts work. is bitterly hostile to democracy. Socra
so far as we can trace his views from the works of Xenophon and Plato,
was at least highly critical of democracy. Plato's views on the subject
are too well known to need stating. Isocrates in his earlier years wrote
panegyrics of Athens but in his old age, when he wrote his more philosophical works, became increaSingly embittered against the political
regime of his native city. Aristotle is the most judicial in his attitude,
and states the pros and cons, but his ideal was a widely based oligarchy.
With the historians of Athens, the same bias is evident. Only Herodotus
is a democrat, but his views have not carried much weight, partly because of his reputation for naivete, and partly because his expliCit
evidence refers to a period. before the full democracy had evolved.
Thucydides is hosWe: in one of the VfItY few passages in which he reveals his personal views he expresses approval of a regime which dis7Th!S is not to rule out comparisons, however, We can say that
Athens in the fourth century has muoh in common with Great Britain in second
part of the twentieth oentury A.D. For Britain after World War II there was a
constant conflict between her vision of herself as Mistress of the Seas (ItThe
sun never sets on British 80il") and the simple reality that ahe was no longer
a first-line Power. This conflict produced the ragged roar of the BriUsh lion
in the Suez crisis. But to say that Athens is like this does not carry with it
the privilege of Judging Athenian practices in terms of, say, modern British
ideals andpractlces •
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franchised about two-thirds of the citizens, those who manned the fleet
on which the survival of Athens depended. Xenophon was an ardent admirer of the Spartan regime. Aristotle, in the historical part of his
monograph on the Constitution of Athens followed--rather uncrit1cally-a
source with a marked oligarchic bias. Only the fourth century orators
were democrats; and their speeches, being concerned with practical
political issues-mostly of foreign policy-or with private ligation, have
little to say on the basic principles of democracy, which they take for
granted. 8
The democracy of Athens, which the whole world has held in admiration, was
not so admired by some of its citizens--parUcularly not so by some of her
leading intellectuals.

care

must be taken not to accept their testimony un-

critically.
In analyzing the activity of the radical democracy which was the

Athens of the fourth oentury, two underlying principles in particular functioned
as mainsprings for her conduot: equal.1ty and auton0m1a (the desire for preserving the life of the R9l1s) • Aristotle in the Polities in his disoussion of
the characteristios of rad1cal democracy has an extended explanation of
equality. For the radical democrat, says Aristotle, society is based on liberty
for all to govern in tum and for all to live as they like. And so officials of
government are elected by all from all, most of the magistracies are chosen by
lot, there is little or no property qualification for holding office, there is short
8A. H. M. Jones, liThe Atheman Democracy and Its Q'itlcs,"
cambridge Historioalloumal, XI (1953), 1-2.
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tenure for office-holding, judicial functions are exercised by all the citizens,
the assembly of the citizens is sovereign over all matters, there is payment for
public duties

80

that all may perform them, and, says Aristotle, "low b1rt.~,

poverty, and wlgarity If are the qualifications which recommend a man. 9
Gustave Glotz explains this emphasis on equality: "Equality was for them
[the Athenians] the condition of liberty; it was, indeed, because they were all
brothers, born of a common mother, that they could neither be the slaves nor
the masters of one another. ,,10 This equality cannot be interpreted merely as
an equality before the law, such as the French Revolution provided for every
Frenchman. It meant nothing less than the extention of privilege from the domain of the few to every citizen. I 1 Every citizen, just because he was a
citizen, shared equally with every other citizen in the tolls and the benefits of
the state. Such is the foundation for the idea already presented that the
citizens have a right to share in the income of the state.
On the political level this equality was achieved in virtually per9Arlstotle Polit1gs vi. 1. 1317bl-1318a2. 6-9.
l°Gustave Glotz, The Greek City and Its Institutions, trans.
N. Mallinson (London: I'.egan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1929), p. 129.
11 E. M. Walker, "The Periclean Democracy, II The Cambridqe
Ancient WstoJy, ed. J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, V, 103.
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fect fashion. Some of the leaders of the state, such as Demosthenes, came
from very wealthy backgrounds, but some, such Demosthenes' nemesis,
Aeschines, came from the relatively poor strata of society. But in a fuller
sense, the attainment of equality was blocked by the overwhelming reality of
the gap between rich and poor. And this, it was well realized, had its own
effect on political equality. Athens was faced with this fact:
Political equality would disappear if social equality were too glaring;
liberty Without a minimum of property or easy means of access to it would
be nothing more than an abstract principle. It was the duty of the State,
therefore, since it was possessed of the power, to remedy an evil dangeu'Ous to the whole community and fatal to democracy. It had to safeguard the rights and interests of one group without at the same time
regarding and over';"r1ding the rights and interests of another group .1

fa-

In some Greek states failure to recognize this led to bloody strife. Athens was

spared from this except for the abortive revolutions in 411 and 403. For Athens'
response was to make the rights of all equal but the obligattons of the citizens
proportionate to their degree of wealth. The rich were expected to contribute
generously out of their wealth for the upbulldlng of the City. Many of these
contributions, such as the liturgies and the trierarchles, were a source of
pride for those who had the means to be able to make such contrlbuUons, but
there were also naked taxations such as the eisphgrae. If the exactions became
12Glotz,

The Greek City, •• , 315.
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too great, the rich would complain that the poor were trying to bleed th.m.
There wes also the temptation felt by the poor at times to confiscate the wealth
of the well-te-do. In general, howev.r, a balance was maintained, but the

problem of wealth

VI.

poverty always lurked below the surface as a threat to

the equality sought by the democrat.. In the fourth c.ntury this pz-oblem tended
to be accentuated, for Rostovtzeff marks aut as one of the saUent features of
this century "the laps. of the mass of the population into proleterianism
and ••• the growth of unemployment. t.13 There wes elso in the public mentel1ty a very greet sensitivity on this point. Glotz cit.s two exampl.s:
De1narchus r.pz-oach.d Demosth.n.s for having been carri.d to the
Piraeus in a Utter and insulting in this way ordinary pedestrians: and a
law of Lycurgus forbad. women to go to the feast of £leusis in carriages,
in order that the poor women should not be offended by the great
ladies .1 4
The State adopted many dtfferent methods in an effort to alleviate this imbalanc. • Pay was given to military personnel and to those serving in civic
offices. Cleruchies provid.d a new Ufe for the poor. Public works were instituted, assistanc. wes given to the handicapped, distributions were made of
13 M. Rostovtzeff, The Socill and Economic History of the
Hellenistic World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941), I, p. 94.

14Glota, The

Greek CitY

t

•
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31 5.
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gifts to the state or of booty, efforts were made to keep the price of grain
down (bow often Athens' activities in the northern Aegean are related to this!),
and finally, Theoric distributions were made. Thus the state sought to assure
equality among all the citizens.
The second operative prinoiple was that of autoDOmia. Werner
Jaeger explains this:
Throughout the centuries from Homer to Alexander, the fundamental
fact in Greek history was the oity state, the form of political and
spiritual life which was fixed very early, and never wholly abandoned •
• • • In other words: the Greeks were not able to think of giving up the
independence of their City-states any more than today we have been able
to think in pr,cUee of giving up our own national states in favour of any
more comprehensive form of state .15
WhUe it is true that some Greek thinkers, such as Isoorates, urged that the
Greeks unite in political union under a slnole leader, by and large the Greek
city-states oould not be induced, except by naked force, to give up their

AutoDomJ.a for anything more than the briefest period. In time of oommon
danger--the Persian Wars provide an Instanoe-theae oities will join together.
But when the danger passes, they withdraw apart, ridding themselves of anything which smacks of limitation upon their individual sovereignty. Autonomy
15Wemer Jaeger, bideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans.
Gilbert Highet from 2d German ed. (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1944-45),
nI, 265-66.
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was a principle to wh10h the Greek city-states h.ld to with deep passion and
"que l'on defendalt farouchement ... 16
In Athens thi. common principle manUesteel itself particularly in

the drive for attaining and holding the empire (

dpx4.

It was a ca.e of Athens

having to rule others or she herself would be ruled. For a while all Gr••k
cities were heavily dependent upon imports for their economic Ufe, 17 Athen.
in particular

WIlS

in thi. stat•• Attica was very poor and was not well suited to

the growing of orain, the ba.te foodcrop. It became .imply ••••ntial for
Ath.n. to maintain the grain route to Thraoe end the Black Sea. Shoold this
route in particular be clo.ed, Athen.· naUonal We would be Imperiled. And so
Athens sought to protect th1a route by her po•••• slon. in the northern Aegean
and .ought also to keep other state. In thi. area weak. As a minimum Athen.
felt that .he had to hold Euboea, Lemno., Imbroa, and Scyro.. She al.o felt
it mo.t desirable to hold or el.e have alUed to herself the t.rrttorie. around the

Helle.pont and the Bo.porus. One glanoe at the map make. clear the re1ationship of these terrttories to Athens and the Black Sea area and also makes clear
16Jeen Luccloni, Rlmla"
Unlversitaires de France, 1961), P.S.
17 Rostovtzeff, I, 91.

es Ie bnhell'nil. (Paris: Prel.e.
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that lithe foreign policy of the Athenians was largely a grain policy. 1118 In the

fourth century Athena bad much more difficulty preserving her "rights # .. as she
considered them to be # in th1a area. Besides the purely economic motivation,
Athens in this century was also motivated by memories of lithe good old days"
of the fifth century when she was Ruler of the Islands.

In the time of Demosthenes men generally took one of two positions
on equaUty and autonomy. One group, dominated by the trading interests and
the wealthy, was generally in favor of peace, for in time of peace trade

pr0-

ceeds in an orderly fashion and there is little danger of special taxes
(tisphoq.). But peace they called for only as long as the main trade routes
were protected. If the great routes to the Bosphorus and the Black Sea were
threatened, they expeoted the city to take necessary defense measures. Their
program: peace with strength and honor, ••curtty from exploitation by the poor.
The poor, however, were generally in favor of an imperialistic policy even if it
meant war, for thi. was an obvious way both to assure the food prices rema1n1ng at a rHsona.ble level l'l)d to obtftin work in the army or the fleet. At
home they wanted wealth enough to assure the. a decant existence and to give
18A. M. Andreades, A Utatoo' of <;bet Public Finance, trans.
Carroll N. Brown (2d ad. rev.: Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U .. Press, 1933),
p. 243.
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them respect among all the:ir fellow citizens.
These principles were applied to practical realiti.a through the actiVity of what may be called political partiea. Theae "parti.s II do not aeem to
have been tightly organized in the Continental European fashion or aa we find
to a lesser degree in the United States. Demosthenes gives in rhetorical
fashion some idea how thea. party groupings were organ1zed:
Once, men of Athens, you paid the t"QbQra by tax-boards. Now you
conduct political affairs by s1m11ar groupings. An orator 1s the leader of
each group with a general and three hundred [an indefinite numbeiJ to do
the shouting und.. him. The rest of you ascr1be yourselves, 80me to one
group, 80me to another .19
But it does seem that party lines in general diVided along the lines of rich and
poor.
In the fifth century three general polit1cal groupings could be

found. The oligarchs formed. a secret party which sought radical change in the
AthenJ.an constitution. They were supported by certain of the wealthy. intellactuals who adm1red the constitution of Sparta. and other dissident elements;
and they attained power only for brief periods in 411 and 403. Totally opposed
to the ollgarchs were the radical democrats. Tb1a party supported the war with

19Demosthenes U. 29.
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Sparta. Their goals: to defend the democracy (protect the power of the people
in law court and assembly) and to retain the empire. 20 Between these two
groups were the moderate democrats. These accepted the democratic constitution but "wished to limit the absolute power of the people, either by restriot1ng
the franchise, or by defln1n9' the powers of the assembly, and to aboUsh pay
for state services except in the army ...21 They sought peace but did not want
to lose honor or the empire. During the Peloponne.lan War this party tended to
become amorphous, leaving the real struggle for power in the state to the more
extreme groups. But with the destruction of the oligarchical coup in 403, the
oligarchs were reduced to powerless political clubs (~,-a, p £ Ta 1

),

and only

the moderate and rad1cal democrats remained. Though TIleramenes, a moderate
democrat, had been a major anti-ol1garcb1cal figure, his compromise desire for
rule IIby the Five Thousand" was not fulfUled. In the fourth century, conaequently, though certain thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates continued to press for a moderate democracy or an aristocracy, in the political
arena the two major pollUcal groupings tended to drop their basic ideological
differences. This was praoUcal politics: liThe masses had • • • a large
20L. Wb.1ble,., rol1t1C11 ParUes in Athtnl During the Peloponne,1an

YiM (cambridge: University Press, 1889), pp. 68-70.
21.1JiWl.., 95-96.
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majority in the Assembly and could at any time outvote those who repre.ented
the agricultural, commercial, and finanoiallnterest .... 22 Pickard-Cambridge
expresses a strong indicat10n of this new rapprpohement:
It is remarkable that of the leaders In politics, the general., the ambassadors, and the finanCial and administrative officials, a very larve pr0portion were men of wealth. Thi. not only implie. the ab.ence of .trong
ala .....feeling, but It also shows that the masses were not unready to entrust their affairs to those who felt themselves called upon to lead, and
able to do so, whoever they might be. 23
Raphael Sealey strongly accept. thi. view of the non-ideologioal character of
Athenian political parties in the fourth oentury:
Many modern writers have assumed that Athenian parUes constantly differed on very general questions of principle, and the supposed parties
have sometimes been given such names as 'oonservative', 'moderate',
'radical'. ·oligarchic·. There Is no reason to doubt that partie••ometime. disagreed on immediate issue. of polieyJ but it has been shown
that sometimes they agreed on such matters. Therefore it was not taken
for granted that polltioians of different parties would disagree on immediate problems • • • • A fortiori it was not taken f~ granted that political
groups would disagree on very general questions. ..
And so Demosthene. and Eubulus, the leading politioians of the period under
consideration, had their followers but relied chiefly upon convincing the
Assembly of the people by argument and rhetadc that their program or their plan
22piokard-CambridVe. 77.
23Wsl:, 79.

24 Raphael Sealey, "Athens after the Soclal War," lqumal
Hellen1c Studies. L>OOI (1955), 80.
.
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was most suited to the interests of the citizens. Political life was not the
clash of warring ideologies, none wishing to yield to the other, but a constant
effort to unite various interest groups, particularly the rich and the poor, in
achieving a common policy. One political group did not support equality and
autonomy whUe the other opposed it, but both general groups supported these
principles, differing only in the practical sphere of implementation and in. the
degree that these objectives should be atreased. The battle was fought not
over the validity of these principles but over their interpretation in dally life.25
In such a Situation the TheOl'lc Fund became an important weapon of
poliey, a lever which might be used to promote or possibly to diminish both
equality and autonomy. It was not for nothing that Demades called the Theor1c
Fund'the cement of the democracy ... 26 The Tbeoric payments served, first of
all, as a levelling force. The greater part of the taxes came from the rich, for
taxes were generally based on property owned. When there was a surplus all,
. of course, collected the Theone payments if they wished. But the greater pert

2SIt is interesting how this non-ideological alignment resembles
the polittcs of the United States. Whlle in the·1930s Popular Front Soctal1sm
and currently in the 60s Goldwater Republicanism represent definite ideological
groupings, the general struggle between Deaoorats and Republicans has not
been up to this time a struggle of ideologies but over the right means to aohieve
the American ideal.
26plutarch "Quaestiones Platonicae," MoraUa lOll B.
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of the citizens, as has been seen, owned small estates or even no estates and
could be classed as lower middle-class or poor. The many, therefore, would
receive the money which largely came from the wealthy few. The Thectic Fund
was an important addition to the income of many poorer families. In this way,
as 1n the system of state pay and public works, the wealth of the state was
slowly redIstributed and social equal1ty was increased. AnY' reduction in the
Theoric Fund would slow this process as well as reduce the cash income of the
poor.
It seems at first examination that when the Theonc Fund promoted
equality, it functioned at the same time to impinge on autonomy, while if tbe
Theoric money were to be used for military purposes autonomy would be
stre1l9thened but equality weakened. From several recorded instances it seems
that the Theonc Fund did indeed provide a abeck on war for those who wanted
to limit war. Cawkwell suggests that when Eubulus came to power c. 3SS that
he realized that if peace was to succeed it must prove to be tangibly profitable.
..
,
"Hence the ill-famed distributions of ,-0 Gsrop t XQ which were probably indispensable if the Athenian People was to be saved from Its own folly. ,,21 It has
been suggested that the Theone Fund gave Eubulus the freedom to turn Athens

21 G. L. c.wkwell, "Eubulus, It Journal of Hellenic Stu<U!l,
LXXXIlI, (1963), 52.
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to a defensive viewpoint in foreign relations, buUding up her fleet and fortifications but avoiding outright war unless necessary. 28 Demosthenes himself
reports that in 346 Eubulus pua.hed the Peace of PhUocrates through by telling
the people that it was either that or turning the Theone fund over to military
purposes. 29 Plutarch reports that as late as 330 Demades managed to dissuade the people from Joining in a revolt against Alexander by promising them a
larve distribution of money (which looks suspiciously, despite its outrageous
size, like a possible Theonc distribution (though the amount, fifty drachmas,
is probably exaggerated) .30 But to say that the Fund did provide such a check
does not of itself condemn the Fund as a corruption of the people or some sucb
thing. But a more serious charge is that the Theoric Fund seriously limited
military preparedness because it channeled all the surplus funds back to the
people. Waging war was an expensive business in the fourth century because,
chiefly, the techniques of warfare were beyond the capability of a hastily
called-out citizen army. More and more there was reliance placed on professional soldiers to do the fighting for the city. The very fact that war was now
fought year around meant that fewer and fewer citiZens could afford such ex28Pickard-Cambridge, 128-29.
29Demosthenes xix. 291.
30plutarch "Praecepta Gerendae Reipubl1cae," Moral1a 818 E... P.
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tended tours of duty as often resulted. Much money had to be on hand in order
to wage an extended campaign. It has been estimated, for example, that the
Social War cost Athens one thousand talents for mercenary troops alone.
It wUl be necessary, therefore, to examine whether the Theoricxm
really did promote equality only, while at the same time reducing autonomy.
Was the politician who dealt with the Theoric Fund put in the position where be
had to cboose between supporting equality or autonomy, Or was there some
third possibUity? It will be the contention of this paper that neither the polley
of Eubulus nor that of Demosthenes accepted this dilemma.

CHAPTER 'N

DEMOSTHINES AND THE THIORIO FUND

It Is clear that the Theor1c Fund potenUelly could playa significant
role in the pol1t1cal declslons which govwned the Athenian state. It dealt annually with an important sum of money, at l.st under normal circumstances; it
was of interest to the poor .s a means of inonas1ng their income: it was a potent1al source of fund. for other proJects within the.R2lll: and it provided a
possible lever for the individual politician or pol1t1cal group to influence

pol~

It must now be asked how one such politician, one Demosthenes, son of

Demosthenes of the deme Paeanta, dealt with the reality which this Fund presented.
In consider1nt Demosthenes the politiCian it must be remembered

that he was a man of wealth and substance. He says candidly in the SRIS

ADM

Meldias that he was for ten years a chairman of one of the tax boards

and that he paid the same share of the taxe••• some of the very r1ch.st men in
Athens. 1 When he ftrat entered the pollt1cal arena he seems to have been a
1Demosthen.s XXi. 157.
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follower of Eubulus, spokesman for the interests of the wealthier members of
the~.

However, thJ.s .ssOC1ation did not last long; and for most of his

pol1t1cal career Demosthenes supported and later led the radical democrat

group. His sympathies were thus with the many.

The classic oplJUon of Demosthanes 18 that his polley remained inflex1b1e from the early speeches of the state trials through to the lpuoh

on tilt

CroWD. a spen of over twenty-flve years. He is pictured as a pa.sionate
patriot or fanatic ever struggling against the danger from the North, concerned

only with this one reality. But such is not the case, nor will the speeches of
Demosthenes permit auoh an interpretation without violence. Demosthenes began pol1Uoal life a •• pert1san of Eubulus against the group supporting Artstophon. Werner Jaeger, generally a strong proponent of the flexlbllity of Demos-

thene.· pollcie., makes the point that the early speeches of Demosthene. were
all concerned with measures important to the financial polley of the state, a

viewpoint dear to the party of Bubulus. 2 With the rise of Philip Demosthenes
turned his energy to mob1l1zing Athens against this threat ~m the North, but he
was enough of • reaUst to aupport the Peace of Pb1100rate. when Athena no

OrJ.qm

2Wemer Jaeger, Demoathwl! the
and Growth of His
Poijgy, trans. Edward Robinson (Berkeley: University of CalJfomta Press, 1938)
pp. 56-57.
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1011981' had the resources to oany on the war w1th Ph1lip. For Demosthenes resistance ehould only be carr1ed on at (what seemed to him at least) a favorable
time • 3 Without going into the development of his policy in deta1l, the point

to be made now 1s that Demoathenes' policy muat not be looked upon as rigid
and unchal19in9 • Rath.. Demosthenes approached the problems of state in a
somewhat flexible and pragmatic fashion. He was not simply an opportunist,
but by no stretch of the imagination can be be called a dogmaUst. 4
How then did Demosthenes regard the Theor1c Fund? COmmonly it
Is held that Demosthenes was dead set against this }\and, which he felt deb1lilated the people. However, 1t eball be contended in this chapter that
Demoathenes, as a radical democrat staunchly in favor of promoting the
equality of all the Citizens, was a support.. of the Theone Fund. Such was his
principle continuously during the whole period. of the struggle with PhU1p of
Macedon. But Demosthenes was also fervently dedicated to maintaining the
3af. Demosthenes v (On the Peace) •
4r8""..'. DeJpodll!a!lI The 0rJg1D and

Growth ~~ In

1ts entirety i8 a witness to this pOint. Pickard-cambridge [QlmoSth!Mi aDd
Ibl Ltd paXJ of Qreels FrJedom--3§4-322 1,0. (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1914)] likewise approaches Demosthenes in this fashion, wh1le Gustave
Glatz [ItDctmoathene et Ie. Finances Alb'niennel de 346 ;. 339, II Rivue
Hiatorique, OLXX (1932), 386] Is willing to solve critical problems in Demo.thenes by appealing to this viewpoint.
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autonomy of Athens. When circumstances demanded, Demosthenes attempted
to weigh these different aspects to attain his goals most effectively. If the
state could not affOrd while locked in combat with Philip to use its surpluses
for Theonc distributions, it could give this money as wages for those who
served either in the armed forces or in a civic capacity at home. Instead of by
direct distributions, the alm of, equality must be promoted by wages. But when
Athens no longer needed these armies and home forces, when there '..vas peace,
then the Fund should be restored. And so after Chaeroneia the Fund reappears
again with none other than Demosthenes himself as one of the members of the
Board. This view of Demosthenes' poUey regarding the Theonc Fund would

roughly represent Henri Francotte's opinion on the matter. 5 This position is
quite different from the traditional viewpoint that Demosthenes was always
against the Theoric Fund, which with its inflexible black-and-white
I

character verves at times upon wish-fulfillment. The proponents of the traditiona I position are themselves violently opposed to the Fund; therefore they
want Demosthenes likewise to be opposed. Thus Boeckh, coming upon the

Fourth OOi;pi9' s defense

of the Theone Fund can say only that it i8 a forgery

made of patching from other Demosthenic speeches, for this Theone Fund senti-

; ; , , , ,
5Hend Franeotte, IIEtudee
sur Demosthene: Demo.thene et la
th8ortque, Mus" Belg., XVU (1913), 76-89.
It
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ment as expressed in the speech is contrary to Dernosthenes I usual position
and therefore cannot be his. 6 So also Kahrstedt cynically remarks regarding
the lack of shouting by Demosthenes against the Theoric Fund in the late 340s
and Demosthenes' taking part in the administration of the Fund that things often
look a bit different from the ruler's throne than they looked from the opposition
benches. 7 But this is to try to force Demosthenes' thought into an abstract for
mula and then to be bewildered (or amused) by any deviation. But such, as
shall now be our effort to prove regarding Demos thenes, is not the nature of
living political thought, which strives to deal with changing conditions while

moving to attain its goals.
To provide effective proof for this theory it is necessary to examine
those speeches which deal with the Theoric Fund and see how Demosthenes approaches the Fund in the different political circumstances he met. The perti,
,
8
nent speeches will be considered in chronological order.
6August Boeokh, TlJ.e Public EconomY pf the Athen1lns, trans. from
the 2d German ed. Anthony Iamb (Boston: IJtt1e, Brown and Co., 1857), p.303.
7Julius Beloch, .,p-ie Attische Pgl1Ws ,elt Pericles (Leipzig: Teubner
Verlag, 1884), p. 219.
8netermln11\9 the exact chronology of the speeches of Demosthenes
is no easy matter. A great deal of scholarly effort has been expended on this
problem. While some speeches have been calculated down to the month in
which they were given, others, particularly many of the Judio1al speeches, can
only be hypothetically situated in the chronological sequence. An effort to deal
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with this problem of chronology in detail would be beyond the scope of this
paper. Rather, we wUl appeal largely to a relatively recent study of. this question: Raphael Sealey, "Dionysiu. of Hal1cama88us and Some Demoath.n1c
Dates," Rlne des Etudes G[pcqu". LXVIII (1955), 77-120. His conclusions:
355/4
Aaa!n,t Leptin!s (xx)
354/3
On the Naw-Boards (xiv)
353/2
For the People of Megalopolis (xvi)
353/2 .. * On Organ1laUon (xiii)
352/1
* First Pbilipplo (iv)
351/0
For the IJberty of the RhodJ.,n. (xv)
349/8
... First Olvnthiaq (.l)
349/8
... Second Olvnthiaq (11)
349/8
... 'lb1[d Olvnthiac (11i)
347/6
AgAinst MetdJaa (xx!) -- though part of the speech dates
from an earlier period.
346/5
On the Peace (v)
344/3
Second PhilippiC (vi)
343/2
*On ttlt Fal •• LesJatlon (xix)
342/1
... Fod Pbilippic be)
342/1
... On tilt Qher.one.. (vt11)
342/1
... third PhilippiC (Ix) -- long.r version
330/29
On the Crown (xvW)
... = speeches particularly pertinent to the discussion of the
Thecric Fund
"
"
.. = not aSligned a date by Sealey. Francotte ("Etude.
sur Demosthene:: D8mo.thene et la th8orlqu., .. Muse. Belg., XVII
(1913), 74) assigns speech to this date.
For the placing of the fourth Philippic« On the Qlerson.se, and Third PJl1l1RPiq
in the (sequential) order given, the following article was consulted: Clarles D.
Adams, "Speeches \fIn and X of the Demosthellic Corpus," Cla ••loal rhUol9SIY,
XXXIn, No.2 (Apr. 1938), 129-44. Briefly, he indicates that there was first a
short version of the speech On the O1er,ones,. 'ntis addre.s was nsl publisheci
A few months later the Fourth. Philippiq wal delivered; this was never published
by Demosthenes himself. The TNrd Pb111ppJ.c followed upon the Fourth. Some
years after this Demosthenes published the extant form of the speech 01) the
Chersone.,. This published ¥wsion included the earUer version of the same
name plus many portions of the (unpublished) FouGh PhUippic. After the death
of Demosthenes the unpublished Foyrth PbU1&P1c was found among DemosthelB~
papers and, like the speech(.s) against Meidias, was published by
Demosthen.s t literary executor.

87

The first apparent policy statement on the Theoric Fund is found in
the Speech on Organization, which was delivered in 353/2. At this time Philip
had seized a number of Athenian colOnies in the northwestern Aegean, was active in Tbrace, and had involved himself in the internal affairs of Thessaly and
Phocis. In 352 Athens sent an expedition to protect Thermopylae from seizure
by Philip's forces. In these threatening circumstances Demosthenes used the
opportunity afforded by the discussion of the allotment of a sum of money to
urge that Athens give pay for service rendered to the state rather than welfare
payments. Demosthenes does not oppose the right of the citizens to receive
these payments. 9 But, he says:

• • • 1£ you so organize the receipt of money that it is associated with
the performance of duties, so far from injuring, you will actually confer
on the state and on yourselves the greatest benefit; but 1£ a festival or
any other pretext is good enough to justify a dole, and yet you refuse :.:.
even to listen to the suggestion that there is any obligation attached to
it, beware lest you end by acknowle<fdr19 that what you now consider a
proper practice was a grevious error.
Demosthenes therefore urges that the total revenues of the state be shared Rx
each citizen equally (Aau~av€ tv \lllttS • • • TO t'O'ov ixuO',o,,", but as pay for
those of military age and as overseer's fees "or whatever you 11ke to call it"
9Demosthenes xiii. 2.

10!Q&sL
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for those beyond the age limit. 11 Thus, Demosthenes urges the formation of a
paid citizen army rather than that the revenues of the state be given to mercenary troops. Demosthenes here as always reveals his deep feeling for the
spirit of the fifth century when any function in the state could be performed by
any citizen, when government was not left to professional politicians nor warfare to the generals but all took part.

12 He wishes to restore this pattern of

living, but does not seem to realize in a.lllts implications that life in the
fourth century 1s a different matter, that fighting, for example, has become
much too scientific for citizen armies, called out on short notice, to master effectively. But as for the Theoric Fund, he wishes to attain the goals the Fund
attempts to gain, but in these circumstances when, as it seemed to Demosthenes, the autonomy of the city was threatened, by a different route.
In 351 Demosthenes felt himself politically powerful enough to open
the discussion in the popular Assembly. Athens at this point felt herself to be
in grave danger from Philip. Philip had attacked in the area of the Olersonese

and had given up there only because of illness. Olynthus had made overtures
to Athens for peace and assiStance, and there were parties in that city as well
as in Euboea more or less working in sympathy with Philip. Athens herself had
11 Demosthenes xiii. 4.
12Demosthenes xiii. 21-31.
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had her own territory raided by Philip's fleet. It was at this pOint that Demosthenes rose to make his proposal. His plan:--Athens, instead of maintaining a
defensive stance, should take the offensive against Philip by means of a
standing strike force. Ideally this force should consist of fifty warships with
transports and a large citizen army. But for the moment it was necessary to
settle for a more modest force; and since his pleas in the Speech on Organiza-

l!52!L had had no effect, this army would have to be largely mercenary:
So I propose that the whole force should consist of two thousand men,
but of these five hundred must be Athenians, chosen from any suitable
age and serving in relays for a specified period--not a long one, but Just
so long as seems advisable; the rest should be mercenaries. Attached to
them will be two hundred cavalry, fifty at least of them being Athenians,
serving on the same terms as the infantry. There will also be cavalry
transports provided" So far, so good; and what besides? Ten fastsalling wargalleys .... 3
Demosthenes put a price tag of 92 talents on this force .14 But to obtain this
bargain Demosthenes offered to pay the soldiers only half the usual wage, for
he assumed that the force would live off the land. 15 'A table in which he listed
the sources from which the ninety-two talents might be obtained Is lost; but
since Demosthenes did not make an issue of it, it is likely that he did not in13Demosthenes iv. 21-22.
14Demosthenes iv. 28.
15Demosthenes iv. 29.
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tend to rely on the Theoric Fund.

16

However, the plan does not seem to have

been accepted, for no records of actions against Philip are mentioned for the
year following this speech.

,

There is a certain naivete evident in this proposal of Demosthenes.
WhUe he hoped obviously that this expeditionary force would just be a start to
Athenian efforts, the force itself promised to be so small and so poorly financed
that it could not hope to have been very successful. The fact of the matter 1s
that Athens did not have money avaUable to spend on a strong expedition. The
city was reciverillg from the cost of the Social War and, on top of that, had
just sent an expedition to protect Thermopylae from Philip in the previous year,
an expedition which cost "more than two hundred talents. 1.11 Demosthenes admitted that the city could not afford the pay and maintenance of a force larger
than he proposed. 18 The question 1s whether his force would have been large
enough to accomplish anything--a question which remains without an answer,
for there is no evidence that the people adopted the plan. It is probable that
the fact of limited revenues coupled with doubtful expectations regarding such
16Jaeger (Qemosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Poliqy,
120-21) holds that Demosthenes did not propose turning the Theoric Fund over
to military purposes at this time.
11 Demosthenes xix. 84.
18Demosthenes Iv. 23 •
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an expedition joined to convince the Assembly that the measure was not opportune.
In any case there was a lull in the conflict with Philip. Athens was

occupied only with quarrels with Corinth and Megara in 350. But in very late
350 or early 349 Olynthus, the key city on the Chalcidicean Peninoula in the
North, begall again to make overtures to Athens for protection from Philip. In
349/8 the situation for Athens was this:
In the war against Philip there were two strategic necessities for Athens •

.First, she had to keep Philip from l:naldng into Greece and co-operating
with Thebes 1n an attack on Attica itself, and the second matter, of equal
or even greater importance, was to protect her lifeline through the
Hellespont and the Bosphorus, clearly in constant danger through
Macedonian expansion eastward. The war in the north was in itself far
less important and it acquired interest for serious Athenian statesmen 1n
so far as 1t became a possible means of preventing Philip from ruining
Athens by attack or by starvation .19
It is in this oontext that Demosthenes urges the Athenians to send military assis'tance to the Olynthians to protect them from Philip. For, he says, 'I. • • if
we leave these men, too, in the lurch, Athenians, and then Olynthus Is crushed
by Philip, tell me what is to prevent him from marohing henoeforward Just where
he pleases ,,;20 and" ••• 1s anyone here so foolish as. not to see that our neg19 G. L. cawkweU, lithe Detenlse of Olynthus, II Classical Quarter1L LVI, No.1 (May 1962), 134.
2°Demosthenes 1. 12.
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ligence will transfer the war from Chalcidice to Attica? ,,21 Demosthenes thus
wanted to keep Philip as far at bay as possible. He therefore urges that one
expeditionary force be sent to aid the Olynthians and a second to raid Philip's
territory. He does not spell out in detail how these forces should be financed
but he does say the following:
With regard to the supply of money, you ~ money, men of Athens; you
have more than any ~er...nat1on has for JV,1litary purposes. But you ap

priate it yourselves fJ11E ' S • • • Aalll3aV€TE), in such a form as you
please. Now if you will spend it on the campaign, you have no need of a
further supply; if not, you have--or rather, you have no supply at all.
'What I' someone will cry, 'do you actually move to use this money for
military purposes? t Of course I do not. Only it is my opinion that we
must provide soldiers and that there must be one uniform system of pay
in return for service. YoW' opinion, however, is that you should, without
any trouble, Just appropriate the money for your festivals. Then the only
alternative is a war-tax, heavy or light, as circumstances demand. 22
By this date, then, the surpluses must have been large enough to finance military expeditions. It seems from this text that Demosthenes strongly preferred
that the people choose to use the Theoric Fund money to support the expedition
rather than that they place the great burden of an e1sphora. upon (chiefly) the
rich. It would seem at first that Demosthenes is supporting the interests of the
rich in proposing this alternate to eispho@e. He may have threatened the
Theoric Fund as a ploy to insure that at least some money would be forthcoming
21 Demosthenes 1. 15.

22Demosthenes 1. 19-20.
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even if only by means of the eisphorae. If this is the reason, then Demoathenes did not so much side with the wealthy as simply use every avenue of approsch to get money for the Olynthus struggle. But his position is subsequently clarified, as shall be seen.
In the Second OlynthiaQ Demosthenes again urges that help be sent
to Olynthus. This duty he proposes for the people:
To sum up, I propose that all should contribute (£ 1C1 ::pep £ 1. V ) equitably,
each according to his means, that all should serve in tum until all have
taken part in the campaign, that all who wish to address you should have
a fair hearing, and that you should adopt the best advice offered, not
just what this man or that man is pleased to suggest. 2 3
In this speech Dernosthenes says not a word about using the surpluses; in the

two other places in which he mentions the duty of the citizens, the verb
eisRberein, meaning lito pay a special tax,

/I

appears. 24 It seems that at this

point Demosthenes felt that the people were just not ready to give up the
Theoric Fund. .Demosthenes notwithstanding, the people apparently believed
the fall of Olynthus was not something which would immediately affect Athens.
If the expedition proposed in the First Philippic cost ninety-two talents, such

an expedition as Demosthelles now proposed might well cost much mora than
that. If the people did not feel the immediacy of the problem which Demos23Demosthenes 11. 31.
24Demosthenes 11. 13; 24.
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thenes set before them, this might well be part of the reason that Demosthenes'
plan for all-out measures did not receive popular approbation.
Demosthenes returned to his efforts to send effective aid to
Olynthus in the Third Olynthiac. He must have felt that the greatest obstacle
to action was the financial question, for most of this speech is spent on his
proposed solution to this problem. Demosthenes felt that if some other solutio
could be found for this problem of financing an expedition, there would be no
need to use the Theoric;: money. 2 5 But he is not of the belief that at this point
there is any other solution

b~t

to use the surpluses. Therefore nomothetes

MUS

be appointed and the legal blocks to the turning over of the Theoric Fund to
military purposes be removed. 26 But Demosthenes does not wish to take this
money which helps to bring equality to the city away from the people. He
wishes rather to show the Athenians how they can both serve their city and
ha ve their money:
You will ask me if I mean pay for military service. Not only that, men of
Athena, but also the immediate adoption of a uniform system, so that
each citizen, receiving his sheare from the public funds, may fill his proper place in the service of the state. If peace can be preserved, he is
better off at home, safe from temptations into which v{ant might lead him.
If some such contingency as the present arises, then it is better for him
to serve his country in person, as indeed he ought, supported by these
2SOemosthenes iii. 19.
26Demosthenes iii. 10-11.
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same funds. If anyone is too old to fight, then as overseer or manager
some indispensable work, let him be paid on an equitable system the
wages ~at he now receives without benefit to the state. [emphasis
mine] a
Demosthenes does not deny that the cit1zens need the money; he wants service
to be rendered in this present contingency to the state for the money. While
Demosthenes--good debater that he is--is critical of the Theoric Fund in this
speech in an effort to make his point clear to his audience, he is not at all
critical of the basic goals of the Theoric fund. Rather, he proposes an alternate route to the attainment of these goals--and this route to be used only in a
t.ime

.)f

crfals J Demosthenes does not urge the abolition of the Theorlc Fund bu

only the use of the Fund in this crisis to provide pay for those serving the stae.
It is in this light that his proposals regarding the Theoric Fund given in the
First OlYnth1ec must be understood.
Demosthenes' concern with financial matters i. not difficult to understand. Perhaps no other ltem drained more revenue from the state than a
military campaign. The cost of the Soclal War has already been mentioned-1000 talents .pent for mercenary soldlers alone. 28 The short expedltion by
Athens to Thermopylae in 352 cost over 200 talents, though thls figure included
27Demosthenes iii. 34.
28Isocratea Areopaq1t1qus 9.
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the private expenses of the troops. 29 The siege of a fortified city could cost
several thousand talents. But just to ready a single trireme cost two talents,
while its crew of 200 men would be paid 4 obols each a day. A soldier would
also expect to be paid 4 obols a day, while a cavalryman would expect three
times as much. Demosthenes once estimated that Athens would need 1000
cavalry, 300 ships, and a multitude of infantry if she wished to retain her
power.

30

Clearly such preparedness would not be had cheaply. Hence the

continual concern that can be noted in Demosthenes I speeches for financial
backing for military affairs.
10 the Speech Against Neaera, listed as LIX in the Demosthenic

Corpus, is found recorded the account of Apollodorus' motion, made in 348, to
tum thf.; fheoric mOlley over to the military fund. The account is given by one
Theomnestu s , brother-in-law to Apollodorus, as a part of the introduction of
Apollodorus, who was to be the main speaker in the accusation against the
. ,
31
courtesan Neaera. This speech is usually dated to the year 339 .
The sym29Demosthenes xix. 84.
30Demosthenes xiv. 13.
31This is the customary date given. But Schaefer (Demosthenes
unci Seine Zeit (2d ed. rev.: Leipzig: B.G.Teubner Verlag, 1886-7), nI, 399)
dates it to 343 and Blass places it between 343 and 340. See his argumentation:
Friedrich Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit (2d ed.: Leipzig: B.G.Teubner,
1893), III, Pt. 1, 535-36. In any case the speech is relatively distant 1n time
from the events related in LIX. 3-8.
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pathetic account of Apollodorus' action becomes important if it can be shown
that the speech was actually written by Demosthenes. But it was not according
to the opinion--almost
unanimous--of the scholars who have considered the
,
question. There are seven speeches preserved in the works attributed to Dt!m
thenes which involve Apollodorus as prosecutor. It 1s the opinion of Werner
Jaeger th-'!t because one of these, ApoUodorus vs. Stephanus (xlv), is genuine,
the ~ther speeches also were prsserved. 32 But Jaeger states defiaitely that the
Speech Against Neatn"p 1s spurious. 33 The opinions, therefore, exp,'essed in
the speech cannot be attributed to Dernosthenes with any sort of necessity.
But the account also becomes important if a definite political link
between Demosthenes and Apollodorus ca n be discovered. In other words, did
Apollodorus make his motion at the behest of Demosthenes? Then certain conclusions about Demosthenes' own feelings might be drawn. Some have concluded that there was such a close working arrangement between the two men.
32Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His PolicY, 39.

3~.,

216. Neither Blass nor Schaefer nor Pickard-cambridge
nor Jaeger accept the speech as Demosthenic. Blass pOints out that even the
ancient critics such as Harpocration, Athenaeus, Phrynichus, and the "so
wenig kritischen" L1banius doubt the Demosthenic character of the speech. Cf.
Friedrich Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit (2d ed.: Leipzig: B. G. Teubner,
1fj93), III, Pt. 1, 5'35.
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About the year 312 Apollodoru. la1d a claim again.t a certain
Phorm1o for tw.nty talents owed o.ten.ibly by Phormto to Apollodorus because

of c.rtain bu.ine.s tranaacUon. t.n year. earUer. But Phormio count.-ed with

a PlASlrapbe motion, c.bervin9 that ApollodoNs' .uit was illegal beoau. Phonnie
had been given a di.cbaJv. from all claim. by Apollodoru. and becau.e the .uit
was mad. beyond the time pre.cribed by the .tatute of Umitation.. Phormio's

.peech was Written by Demo.thene., and in the cour•• of the .peech th•• wen
vitr10ltc attacks on Apollodotu. and a colorful contra.ting of the noble Phormio

with the base Apollodoru •• 34 Apollodoru. was defeated and did not receive
even a fifth part of the

vot...

But Apollodorua, angered by the deci.ion of.

fared suit against one of the minor witne •••• who had te.tified on behalf of

Phormio and accu ••d him of perjury. Two speech.s survive in the Demo.th.nic
Corpus from thi••econd aetlon. And both of them are written for Apoij2dOm'

IIAlnIt th' wilnes.« SttRhlDUI.

Of the.e the .econd (xlvi) doe. not appear to

be g.nuin•• But the first 11 very often as.igned to Demolth.n.s both on the

basl1 of internal .videnc. and al.o on the balls of .vid.nce found in
34oamo.th.n.8 XXXVi. 44-45; 53, 55-61.
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Mlchinel •35 For that matter, Plutarch .110 testifle. that Demosthene. did
writ. speech.1 for both Apollodorul .nd Phormlo in th.ir quarr.l. 36 WhU.
Pickard-Cambridge Is hope!uJ. that Demosthen•• did not .ctually .uthor the

ltrat Speech AgainG StgMnus

(xlv), 37 Jaeg.. and Bla.s aSlign the speech un'"

equivocally to Demosthen••• 38 Demolthen.s looks particularly bad to mod.u
eyes because the SpeW "Wt Steoau. a.stgned to h1m 1••uch a vtolent
attack not only on St.phanus but al.o on Ph«mio. The testimony of the previous trial 1. called perJurous, .nd in the gen.,.,l mel•• of name-callJng
Apollodorus Is mad. to attack .ven his own brother. By mod.m standards of
legal for.naics this i •• thCl'OUghly disreputabl. sp.ech, and it would be COQs1dered particularly bas. for Demolth.n•• to have be.n re.ponsible for this at31"you, Demoathen.I, wrote a lpeech for the banker Phormio and
were p,ld for !t: thll apeechyou. communicated to Apollodorul, who was
bringing a capital charg. again.t Phormlo .....-M.chin.1 On the Embalsy 165.
Mschin•• thus distorts the or19inal inoid.nt to put Demosth.nes in an even
wor•• light.
36plutarch Dtmosth.ne, IS.
37plckard-Cambridge, 220-25.
38Jaeger, Dtmosth.ne,; Th. Qr1CJ1n and GroMh of Ws poU9v, 40.
216. Blas. (JU, Pt. 1, 33-34) says: Sl. [di. erst. Red. geg.n Stephanos] hat
,anz und gar Demosth.ntsch. Form, ungl.lch dar sweiten, an deren Uneohthelt
k.in Zweif.l lit • • • ." He goe. on to say that modern authors queltion the
g.nu1n1ty of the Firts Speech Against St'PhanY. becaule they f.el that It does
not fit in with D.molth.n.s· "abr.nhaft.m C21arakter." Bla" hims.lf appeal.
to political rea.ons to explain Demolth.nes· motivation.

100

tack on his former cl1ent. But by ancient standards the logographer was simply
the mouth-piece of the one who employed his service.. The speech writer wa.
not bound by the op1n1ons he expressed for others. And Athenian courtroom
practice

wa. a. much dependent on acid-to1\9Ued invective a.

on anything e1.e

What was DeBlOstbene.· IIIOt1vetion for this change of clients? It
has been sugge.ted that Demosthene. gave his support to Apollodorus in return
for the motion which Apollodorus promised to make against the Theone Fund. 39
But such does not .eem to be the case. In the first place, the motion wa. not
made before 34840 wbile the PhonDio-Apollodorus quarrel date. to 352 aDd the
Fir.t §pV9h MawS ",phallli i. dated by Scbaefer (as well a. by BlOst other
authorltle.) to 351 .41 A four-year gap between the political deal and the payoff Is a bit hard to put credence in. Secondly, Demo.thenes' strategy called

for a fully 18961 attempt to change the Theor1c Fund temporarily over to war PW'pose •• He asked the people to appoint nomothetes to "repeal those laws wh10h
39Bla •• ,

m,

Pt. 1, 33-34.

40ThI. matter was previously discussed in 01. 3. Among others
cawkwell ("The Defense of Olynthus," Cla,atgal outnIrlx, LVI, No.1 (May
1962), 128-30; "Eubulus," lournt1 of HeUenfQ SSUdits, I.JOOOII (1963), 60) and
Bla.s (Ut, Pt. 1, 315-17) hold the 348 date. '!'be motion, says Blas., "mus •
• pat.. fallen ala cUe drttte olynthl.che Red. '•••• "
41Schtefer,

m,

399.
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hamper us in the present aria1...--the Theonc laws. 42 Hi. was a sane,
rational approach, for he knew well what happened to the man who acted outside the law. But the approach of Apollodorus was rash; even if it had suoceeded the people m19ht later have had a change of heart and indicted
Apollodorus for meJdll9 an illegal motion and for deceiving the people. The
move lacked fines.e. It Is possible that this man acted in alliance with
Demoathenes or even by special pre-arrangement, for Demoathenes, at lea.t at
thi. Juncture, did want the end that thl. motion aimed at. But It 1. not likely.
Demosthene. would have been hesitant to oompromise his own political po.ltion
by be1ng linked with such a move. The best that can be said Is that Appllodorua

may have been a follower of Demoathenes' party acting impetuously on his own.
The sentiments apr•• sed in the Speech

Aqamu NU... give no particular clue

to Demo.thenes· own poJJ.cy regarding the Theortc Fund. Ratha-, the account

given 18 a flattering portrayel of what .eems to have been a rather 1l1-con.ceived
act by Apollodorus •
The next time that a mention of the Theoric Fund appears In the
writings of Demoathenes. 1. 1n the Speech on the hl.e Legation r But the Fund
Is mentioned here only In pa.sing .nd it Is difficult to learn much regarding
Demo.thene.' policy. Demoathenes .ddre.... Eubulu. and ind1cates hts .ur42Demosthenes W. 10-11.
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prise that this man who had cursed Philip was now a supporting witness for
Aeschines:
After terrifying the people, and tell1ng them that they must go down to the
Peiraeus at once, pay the war-tax and tum the Theoric Fund into a warchest, or else vote for the resolution that was supported by Aeschines
and moved by that abominable Philocrates, with the result that we got a
discreditable instead of an equitable peace, and after all the ruin that
has been wroUghlfY their subsequent misdeeds, are you reconciled with
them after that?
It is apparent from this that Bubulus took a hand in the critical peace negotiat10ns in 346 and presented the people with a clear either-or proposition in order
to influence them to vote for the peace. For he threatened the rich with wartaxes, the poor with the loss of the Theoric Fund, and everyone with military
service. What is clear from this is that Demosthenes recognized the lever
which the Theoric Fund presented as a means for influencing the people. Demosthenes does not criticize the people for yielding to this persuasion--a
forensic speech would be a dangerous place in which to do that--nor Eubulus
for using this persuasion, but only the fact that he used this persuasion to get
this peace, the Peace of Philocrates (which Demosthenes before had strenuously supported). Demosthenes knew that the Theoric Fund was a significant
feature of Athenian life.
In 342/1 Philip was again on the move. Thraee was now under his

43Demosthenes xix. 291-92.
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dominion (a fact which galled the Athenians since they were accustomed to consider Thrace as their private preserve), and Athens had begun once again to be
gravely concerned for the atersonese, that long tongue of land guarding the entrance to the Propontis and the Black Sea. To guard this passage Athens sent
cleruchs to cardia, the chief city on the peninsula, and also sent a force under
the general Diopeithes, a rather indiscreet man who soon had committed several
open acts of war against Philip. Philip protested to Athens on the conduct of
Diopeithes and called for his removal. Athens was faced with the decision to
hold to the peace or else to declare war on Philip. At this juncture Demosthenes rose to urge the people to support Diopelthes, for as far as he was concerned the peace had long since ended. The precise text of this speech has not
come down to us, but much of it appears in the Speech on the Olerlogel" a
speech combining this address with portions of the Fourth PhiUpplo. (which
speech Demosthenes appears never to have published himself in its full forrd.44
In the published version of the Speeqh on the Olersones; Demosthenes urges

the Athenians not to recall Dtopeithes but to give hIs expedition proper support
so that he wUl not have to make Illegal raids. Again Demosthenes' aim is to
make Philip fight there

80

that Athens wUl not later have to fight him in Attica •

440n this matter see Cllarles D. Adams, "Speeches VIII and X of
the Demosthenic Corpus," ClaSSical fhUology, XXXlU, No.2 (Apr. 1938),
129-44.
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Demosthenes' main request in the speech is for financtal support. Direct org8nized action is needed:

"
, t: l O'CfJEPEtV
"
We refuse to pay war-taxes (XP1111UT
) or to serve in persoll
we cannot keep our hands off the public fund. (Tillv HO t vcov dnEx£0'9at;
we will not pay Diopeithes the allowances agreed upon, nor sanction the
sums that he raises for himself: but we grumble and critioize his
methods. • . • if you are not gOing to pay your contributions, nor serve
in person, nor keep your hands off the publ1c funds, nor grant Diopeithes
his allowances, nor sanction the sums that he raises for himself, nor consent to perform your own tasks, I have nothill9 to say. 45
This is the state in which Demosthenes finds the people--refusill9 to accept an)
alternative. Note that one of the alternatives is for the people to keep their
hand. off the public money, i. e ., to give up the Theorlc Fund distributions.
Then money would be available for Diopeithes. But if the people do not want to
do this they can pay war-tax and serve in person or grant the money promised
to Dlopeithes (which apparently was not appropriated) or give Diopelthes a free
band to make his own arrangements. Demosthenes give. his own preferred

solution:
What, then, is the task of sound patriots? To know and realize all this,
to shake off our outrageous and incurable, slothfulness, to contribute
"
"
funds (XP11'llU-ro.
0' l
£ O'qJEPE1.V),
to call upon our allies, and to provide
and arrange for the permanent upkeep of our existing army, so that just as
4SDemosthenes viii. 21-23.
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Philip has a force ready to attack and enslave all the Greek states, so
you may have one ready to protect and assist them all. 46
Financial problems should be solved, therefore, by levying one or more special
taxes for the war effort; there is no mention of using the Theorlc money. So
also in the closing portion of the speech Demosthenes uses the same t.rminology when recalling to the people their duty regarding Diopeithes' financial condition. 47
In the Fourtb Philippic, delivered shortly after the (unpublished)

Sp'ech on the OtersoQ.al, Demosthenes again mak.s a plea for money for the
f1ght against Philip: "There 1. nothing that the state needs so much for the
coming struggle as money. ,,48 But there is a ray of hope--the King of Persia.
He is aware of Philip's design. and may perhaps be quite ready to support the
enemies of Phllip out of his vast wealth. 49 But Demosthenes Is most concerned
about a psychological barrier to action which has arisen. Some speakers have
been telling the people that "certain persons want to plunder your [their]
wealth", using this charge to blind the people from seeing the real danger which
46Demosthenes vW. 46.
47 Demosthenes vW. 76.
48Demosthenes x. 31.
49Demosthenes x. 31-34.
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Philip presents. 50 It is with this veiled oharge in mind that Demosthenes feels
it necessary to devote a significant part of his speech to explaining hia own attitude toward the Theonc Fund. He feel. that his position haa been misrepresented and that this misrepresentation "1s affording a pretext for those who are
unwilling to perform any of their duties as Citizens, indeed, you will find [he
says] that in every cas. where a man has tailed to do hi. duty, this has been
given

8S

the excuse. ItSl The question of the Themc Fund was apparently a

very hot issue in Athens at that time, for Demosthenes indicates his hesitancy
to discuss the matter. 52 We must, he says, banish from our midst Itthe fear
that the Fund will not be maintained without doing a great deal of harm • • ... 53
He goes on to explain how the Theoric Fund aids the poor (as was d1scussed in
Ch. 2). He concludes this explanation by saying, "What do we then mean by
reproaching one another for this and making it an excuse for doing notb!Da, unless it is that we grudge the relief which the poor have received at the hands of
fortune? I for one shall not blame them, nor do I think it fair to do so"
SODemosthenes x. 55.
51 Demosthenes x. 3S.
52.DWL
53Demoathenes x. 36.
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[ttal1cs mine] • 54 So the wealthy ought to accept their obligation toward the
poor and not use this as a pretense for complaining that they cannot afford to
contribute to the war effort. But at the same time the r1ch have a just gr1evance,
Demosthenes feels, when they see "certain persons transferring this usage from
public moneys to private property • • • • .. 55 Rather, says Demosthenes:
• • • we are bound, Athenians, to share equitably with one another the
privileges of citizenship, the wealthy feeling secure to lead their own
Uves and haunted by no fears on that account, but in the face of dangers
making over their property to the commonwealth for its defense: while the
rast must realize that state property is common property, duly receiving
their share
it, but recognizing that private wealth belongs to the
5
possessor.

ri

And so Demosthenes sWllooka to the people as the prime suppliers of money

money for the fight against PhiliP: Persian gold was only a possibility. Though
aome of his remarks in this speech are no doubt motivated by expediency, conslder1ng that he cUd at least one other time propose that in an acute crisis the
54Demosthenes x. 39.
S5Demosthenes x. 44.
56Demosthenes x. 45.
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Theodc Fund should be used for military purposes. 51 he wants the people to

USE

the war-tax as the main means of raIsing this money. 58 Demosthenes' real concern conUnues to be moUvating the people to use their own resources to fiOht
Philip.
It has often been said that Demosthenes' over-rtd1no concern was
fore1gn policy. And he himself admitted all much in one place at least:
" ••• out of many spheres of public acUvity I chose the affairs of the Hellenes
as my province . . . . . . 59 But the

Fourth lb1l1psiQ, while stUI concerned with

fore1gn affairs, nonetheless shows Demosthenes' concern for the domesUc welfare of Athens. Says Werner Jaeger, "The program for domestic politics in the
Fourth Pbilippig bears witness to the new spir1t of social sacriftce that found It2
expression in the financial polic1es at the beglnning of the war period • .. 60
51James J. Buchanan, Iltheor!.U: A Study of Monetary Distributions
to the AthenJan Citizenry during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B. C." (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Classics, Princeton University, 1954) ,p.l(J)
He accepts the Fourth WiDRig as genuine and explains the Theoric Fund statements 1n the speech purely on the basts of expediency. While this motive must
have been present, it would leave the texture of Demosthenes' other actions and
utterances regarding the Theoric Fund in part quite unexpla1nable as has been
and will be shown. Rather, Demosthenes 1s a proponent of the Theoric Fund.
Though be might have wished in this cdsls to convert the Fund to military purposes, he realized that such a proposal was not well suited to pracUcal reality.
58Demosthenes x. 19.
59 Demosthenes xviii. 59.
60raager, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His PolLeY, 183.
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Demosthenes asks both rich and poor to see the needs and problems of one
another so that all may enjoy the great blessing of equality.
In the Tl}J.rd Phijippic, given a short time later, Demosthanes again

calls for all the Athenians to join in making provision for their defense by Pl"ovic:Ung warships, funds, and men. 61 He does not again discuss in detail how

money should be obtained, but he does recall to mind that patriots in other
ciUes called upon the people to pay a war-tax ( E t (J ':fiEP f.: 'v ), that others said
it was not necessary, and that these cities fell finally into Philip's hands. 62
The moral of the story for the Athenians: pay the tax.
Ftnally, Phllochorus recounts, in 339 Demosthenes made a motion
which was carried that all the public money should be for the war fund:
''
• • • TU" 'bE

~

xpn~aTa

"

Etn~l(JaVTO

".,.
elvat

rraVT

,
aTpUTtwTtXa,

An~oa-

eivouc;; YPU:4;a.VTOS .63 This Is clarifted further by the Aeschines Schol1ast,
who relates that Demosthenes was the first to persuade that the Theonc money
be changed over to the military fund. 64 This was a clear moment of crisis.

War with PhUip had been formally renewed in 340. PhUip had besieged
61Demosthenes Ix. 70.
62Demosthenes Ix. 63-64.
63phllochorus frag. 135.
64Schol • Aesch1nes W. 24.
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Byzantium and Perinthus. But more threatening than this was the fact that
Philip was named general by the Amphictyontc Council in its war against the
Amphisseans. Already having physical access to Hellas by way of

Thermop~ae,

which he now held, Philip now possessed legal access. He promptly came dov.r:
with his army and occupied Elateia, within striking distance of Thebes and
Athens itself. At this point Demosthenes worked furiously to line up allies for
Athens, shepherding even Thebes into the fold. The very life of the city was
threatened. It would have been unreasonable at such a point to spare the
Theor1c Fund, and so the people no doubt readily took the measure to convert
lK,lly the Theoric Fund to military purposes. That Demosthanes did this legally is certain from the fact that he was never accused of acting outside the
law in this matter by any of his many opponents, who surely would have seized
at the added opportunity to attack him had he not made this change-over in a
strictly legal fashion.
But in 337/6 there 1s positive evidence that the Theoric Fund had
been restored, for Demosthenes appears as a member of the Theoric Board. He
testifies to this himself. 65 And Aeschines gives a long explanaUon as to how
Demosthenes, as 1i!A9 of the Theoric Board held almost all the offices in
6SDem08theneS xviii. 113.
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Athens and was therefore subject to public audit. 66 If Demosthenes had been a
fierce opponent of the Theoric Fund as has been alleged, it is impossible to be
Heve that he would then turn around and accept the leadership of the Theoric
Board. Schaefer says that the Fund was restored on a very restricted basis lest
it get out of hand again, implying that Demosthenes was a watchdog over the

Fund.

67

But he offers no proof whatsoever, and it can be concluded that this

was the only way he could explain the situation while still preserving his view
of the noble patriot and lover of freedom, Demosthenes. Pickard-Cambridge is
to the pOint when he says that Demosthenes "had never in fact condemned the
distribution as bad 1n itself, but only as bad when it was treated as 'more im
tant than the vital needs of the State; and he had admitted that if those needs
could be met without suspending the distributions, they ought to be so met." 68
It may be Justifiably concluded that Demosthenes, though he
focused on preserving the autonomy of Athens, wa s also very much ooncerned
about equality. And so we would expect a radical democrat to be. Only in a
moment of dire straits was he willing to give up the 'glue of the democracy,'
66Aeschines Against Qteslphon 24.
67 Schaefer, In, 82-83.
68Pickard-Cambridge, 403-04.
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the Theoric Fund. And in the one speech preserved in which he openly urges
that the Theoric Fund be temporarily put to military purposes, he presents a
carefully worked out plan that the ends lnvis10ned by the Theorlc Fund might
still be attained.

CHAPTER V

THE REIATIONSHIP OF DEMOSTHENES AND EUBULUS RE-EXAMINED

During much of the so-called Demosthenic period, not Demosthenes but Eubulus was the leading politician in the Athenian state. Eubulus'
period of leadership dates from about 353 unW the trial of Aeschines in 343,
and he probably remained an important figure for several years afterwards. The
fact of his power is clear from the speeches of Demosthenes himself, in which
the name of Eubulus occurs often. But though his name appears often it was not
because he and Demosthenes were political allies. Rather, the fall of Eubulus
saw the rise to power of Demosthenes.
The traditional view holds that the policies of Eubulus and Demos-

thenes were totally opposed. Croi.et, for example, names Eubulus as the head
of the "peace party", which had for its aim "to put. to sleep the watchfulness of
the people. III Demosthenes, of course, is pictured as the noble leader of the
"war party", the party of action, true to the ideals of Athens. For Jaeger
1

,.

\,

Alfred Croiset, "L'etat des partis a Athenes au temps de

D~mosth~ne," Revue des Cours at Conferences, XlV (1905-06), 700-02.
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"Demosthenes and his political opponents had diametrically opposite views ", 2
views which were "irreconcilable ... 3 But Jaeger wishes, at least, to make it
clear t..'lat Demosthenes started political life as a supporter of Eubulus, an idea
which is anathema to the more traditional supporters of Demosthenes. 4 Such Is
Jean Luccioni. For him Demosthenes from the very beginning saw Macedon as
the great danger. 5 Demo.thenes always acts as an Athenian patriot. 6 He says:

,

,

,

,

,

Demosthene se proposait non pas de,restituer Ie passe dans sa verite,
mais de lutter contre une sorte
.. de decadence intellectuelle et morale qui
affligeait, selon lui, la Grece de son temps, parce qu'U jugeait que cette
"
decadence compromettait et rendait difficlle la pol1t1que de resistance
energique,
dans l'union de tous les Grecs, , qui devalt
,
7 S 'opposer awe
empietements de ltennem! commun, Ie Macedonlen.
Such also is the position of Arnold Schaefer and many other nineteenth-century
students of the period of Demosthenea.
Of course, such thinking is quite understandable, for this is cer-

2Wemer Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His
PoliCY, trans. Edward Robinson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938)
p. 144.
3 Ibid., 57.

4 Ibid .

5
I
'\
~
Jean Luccioni, Demosth!pe et Ie Panhellenisme (Paris: Presses
Univeraitaires de France, 1961), p. 47.
6~., 50.
7Jl2!s!.., 36.
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tainly the view that Demosthenes wishes posterity to have of him. His SQ!ech
on the Crown (xviii) 1s an uncompromising black-and-white portrayal of himself against the party of Eubulus and Aesch1nes . 8 Such is also the tenor of his
other great attack on Aeachines, the Speech on the False Legation (xix) •
As for Eubulus, Theopompus, who held him in great distaste, helps
to set the tone of the traditional view of modem scholarship. Theopompus
called Eubulus a profligate demagogue who led the city to indolence and cowa
!iness by the distributions of the Theoric Fund. 9 The view of Plutarch Is often
neglected:
And Eubulus the Anaphlystlan also Is commended because, although few
men enjoyed so much oonfidence and power as h9, yet he administered
none of the Hellenic affairs and did not take the post of general, but appUed himself to the finances, increased the revenues, and did the state
much good thereby .1 0
But even this, while sincere, is a left-handed compliment, for it

implie~

that

Eubulus had no direct concern for foreign policy but only for stacking up
drachmas. And so men like Schaefer picture Eubulus thus:
8The link between Eubulua and Aeachines is indicated by Demosthenes xviii. 21: 162; xix. 290-91; 304; Aeschines On the Embassy 184.

EaeOUAOS

9 Cited in Harpocrat1on Lexicon in Decem Oratores Atticos s. v .
and Athenaeus TA, De1posophi8ts iv. 166 D-E.

lOplutarcb MortUa: Praecepta gerendt! relpubl1caeI5. 3. 812 F.
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Bei ihnen handelt es sich nicht um Hingebung an einen hoheren Zweck I
dem nach festen Grundsetzen auch unter Opfern und Gefehren
nachgestrebt wird, sondern um behagUchen Genuss , uberall nicht urn
hellenische Pol1t1k I sondem die ganze Staatsi.unst laiift h1naus auf das
Geschick zu augenblicklicher Aushilfe • • • • 1
George Grote is of the same opinion:
••• Eubulus is the ministerial spokesman, whom the maJority, both rich
and poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know) I but of
simple conservative routine I evading all painful necessities and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property tax, and
the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theoric expenditure .12
Demosthenes in such a picture is the dauntless hero with sword upraised to lead
the people forth to destroy the enemies of Athens and restore the city to her true
greatness. Eubulus 1s only concerned with money; Demosthenes with trUe
ideals.
And so in the traditional pattern Eubulus and Demosthenes are contrasted as black to white. Some, such as Ulrich Kahrstedt, wish to award
Eubulus the white banner I but retain the uncompromising contrast.
More recently I however I this contrast of black and white has been
toned to a pattern of grays. Demosthenes I it is clear, spent his whole political
11 Arnold Schaafer, Demos1henes und Seine Zeit (2d ed. rev.;
Leipzig: B. G. Teubner Verlag, 1886-87), I, 186.
12George Grote, HistorY of Greece (2d ed.; London: John Murray,
1856) I IX, 461.
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life in an effort to maintain Athens as an independent and strong pol1s. His
prime concern, as has been seen, was with foreign policy. Demosthenes'
apologia is his Speech on the Crown. In it he outlines the vision he has of
Athens' position and destiny. A sample statement:
VIas it the duty o.f. our city, Aeschlnes, to abase her pride, to lower her
dignity, to rank herself with The.saUans and Doloptans, to help Philip to
establish his supremacy over Greece, to annihilate the glories and the
p'erogaUves o.f. our forefathers? Or, if she rejected that truly shameful
pOlicy, was she to stand by and permit aggressions which she long foresaw, and knew would succeed if none should intervene? 13
It was Athens' destiny and clear duty to resist AU. the unjust designs o.f. Philip.
This policy, Demosthenes tells us, he forwarded in all his proposals. 14 Demosthenes outlined in detail what his foreign policy was:
What course of action was proper for a pa1:r1otic citizen who was trying to
serve his country with all possible prudence and energy and loyalty?
Surely it was to protect Attica on the sea-board by Euboea, on the inland
frontier by Boeotia, and on the side towards Peloponnesus by our neighbal!
in that direction; to make provision for the passage of our grain supply
along friendly coasts all the way to Pelraeus; to preserve places already
at our disposal, such as Proconnesus, Charsonesus, Tenedos, by sending
succour to them and by suitable speeches and resolutions; to secure the
friendship and aUiance of such places as Byzantium, Abycios, and
Euboeai to destroy the most important of the existing resources of the
enemy, and to make good the defenses of our own city. All thtse purposas
were accomplished by my decrees and my administrative acts •. 5
13Demosthenes xviii. 63.
14Demosthenes xviii. 69.
lSDemostbenes xvW. 301-02.
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All these things werellQ! accomplished by Demosthenes, but at least this is a
reasonable statement of his goals in concrete terms: protecting the territorial
integrity of Attica, guarding the grain route, gaining strong allies, and carrying
the war against Philip wherever it would hurt him. Such a policy assumes that
Athens' sphere of influence included the entire Aegean area. It follows then
that any activity by another power in that area would be considered as a hostile
act against Athens herself. Thus as early as 3&4 Demosthenes began to look
upon Philip as an enemy of Athens because of his activities in the northern
Aegean. This area had been traditionally under the dominance of Athens, but
this dominance had been seriously weakened in the changing conditions of the
mid-fourth century. Demosthenes was also identified with a policy of hot war-Philip, he felt, must be attacked now! Aeschines' accusation that Demosthenes
was a war-monger was not without some foundation in fact. 16
But though this was the guiding fact of his political life, it is to do
Demosthenes a rank injustice as a statesman to say that this was his only concern. For while most of his surviving speeches are concerned with the struggle
against Philip, there is recorded his struggle to reform the tax system (Speech
gn the Tax Boards) and his concern for the welfare of the poor and for equality
in the state (fourth Philippic). And he was also head of the Theoric Fund for a
1GAeschines On the Embassy 177 ~
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time. Domestic affairs were also of concern to Demosthenes; he was not just a
foreign nUnister.
Demosthenes sought above all to revive the greatness Athens once
possessed and to rejuvenate the present by the ideals of t.he past. George
Kennedy recently put it this way:
A splendid passage of On the Qoown (190 fL) betrays the instinct of the
martyr. It must be read with recognition of Demosthenes I assumption that
no fundamental change could be admitted into the Athenian constitution
and traditional way of life, an assumption which others did not accept ane
whioh could not be permanently mainta~ed. In his lonely radicalism,
Demosthenes was a pure conservative. 7
What of Eubulus? He was much concerned, contrary to the opinion
of many of his critics, with preserving the autonomy of Athens. Basically he

wanted peace, for he felt that peace brought many benefits. But this was to be
peace with honor. tubulus did n.91 call for peace at any price. The peace he
inv1sioned was a peace which left Athens strong and well able to defend herself
against aggression.
It seems that Eubulus largely set out to follow the poltoie. advocated by the author of the treatise on the Revenues. This is suggested because
80

many pollcies that can be assigned to Eubulus correspond with those .et

down in the Treatise. Indeed, the Treatise appeared just after the end of the
11George Kennedy, Ille Art
Princeton U. Press, 1963), p. 225.

of Persuasion in Graep, (Princeton, N.J.:
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Social Vlar when Eubulus and his party were struggling to gain control of the
state. It has been reasonably supposed that the Treatise is a public expression
of the "platform" of Eubulus' political group. 18 Though the author's proposals
for the Laureian mines--never, seemingly, implemented by Eubulus--may indicate a looser relationship of the document to Eubulus I policy, the Treatise still
seems to be in its genera.! tone and presentation a theoreticcl Elxpress.ion of the
views of the

~ubulus

group.

The Treatise is a clarion call for peace. For with peace comes full
revenue to the state .19 And peace will bring every sort of blessing, particularly in the economic order, to Athens:
For if the state is tranquil, what class of men will not need her? Shipowners and merchants will head the list. Then there will be those rich in
corn and wine and oil and cattle; men possessed of brains and money to
invest; craftsmen and professors and philosophers; poets and the people
who make use of their works; those to whom anyth1ng sacred or secular ap
peals that is worth seeing or hearing. Besides, where will those who
want to buy and sell many things quickly meet with better success in theiJ:
I8Tames J. Buchanan, "Theortka: A Study of Monetary Distributions
to the Athenian Citizenry during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B. C." (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Classics, Princeton University, 1954),
p. 88. Implied also by~'\Temer Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture,
trans. from 2d German ed. Gilbert Highet (2d ed.: New York: Oxford U. Press,
1944-45), III, 270.
I

I9(Xenophon) Treatise on the Reyenues 5. 11-12.
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efforts than at Athens ?20
And so the author calls for a common peace in Greece. He wishes Athens to
take the lead in establishing such a peace. 21 But if Athens is wronged, she
must protect her rights:
But someone may ask me, 'Do you mean to say that, even if she is
wronged, the state should remain at peace with the offenders?' No, certainly not ( ot5lt d'v q;a t flV); but I do say that our vengeance would fo11o\'\
far more swiftly on our enemies if we provoked no~ by wroIl9-doing;
for then our enemies would look in vain for an ally. 2
In this way all classes within the state will benefit,

m.~ny

civic improvements

will be possible, and Athens shall enjoy both security and the respect of the
other Greek states. 23 Such is a good statement of Eubulus' policy in foreign
affairs.
Demosthenes gives witness that such was actually the policy of the
Eubulus group by his burlesque of the views of 'certain politicians' in the
Speech on the

Ch~rsones~:

• • • wbenever any question arises that concerns Philip, instantly up
. jumps someone and tells you how good a thing it is to preserve peace', and
what a bother it is to keep up a large army, and how certain p6rsons want
20lI;Wl., S. 3-4.
21~, 5. 8-10.

22 Ib1d " 5. 13.
23.D;WL, 6. 1.
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to plunder your wealth, and all that sort of thing; and by these speeche~
they put you off and afford leisW'e for Philip to do whatever he wishes. 4
It is clear that there was a group actively opposed to the policies of Demosthenes and which the people normally followed. Stripping this statement of its
invective-laden tone, it seems evident that this group urged preserving the
peace which had been agreed upon with Philip, was against a large standing
army (particularly a standing army of citizens), and supported the retention of
the Theoric Fund. The reference to plundering the people's wealth appears in
the Fourth Philippic, and 1n that speech Demosthenes, as has been seen, is at
great pains to prove that he, too, supports the Theoric Fund. 2 5 Putting this .
statement in the context of the views expressed by the Treatise-author, it is
easy to imagine that this opposing group was against offensive military action
unless Athens' interests were clearly threatened. And so Demo.thenes· policy
of fighUng Philip wherever and whenever possible was not aooeptable to them.

Eubulus wanted peace. But at the same time Eubulus deemed it essential to maintain the key positions of Athens: the sea-ways to Pontus, the
points which governed this route--Imbros, Lemnos, and the Olersonesus,
ThermopyIae, and Euboea. For these he would use the necessary means to af24Demosthenes viii. 52.
25Demosthenes x. 55.
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ford them reasonable protection. 26 When Philip appeared on the scene, this
doctrine had to be applied to a new set of practical realities. 'llhile Demosthenes chose the path of all-out war with Philip and urged that a full military ef..
fort: should be made near Macedon itself, Eubulus urged that AthenIan resources
be used in a defense of Greece. In accordance with this poUcy Eubulus promoted the expedition which prevented Philip from attaining control of l'hermopylae in 352.

27

He seems to have been the chief supporter of the expedition to

Euboea in 349/8, for the general allied to him, Phocion, was put in charge of
the expedition and Meidias, another supporter of Eubulus, seems to have promoted the expedition. 28 In 346E\.lbulus and Aeschines tried to form a league
against Philip but without success. 29 And Eubulus, as has been previously
shown, built up a velY strong Athenian fleet. Indeed, it is the opinion of G.L.
26Julius Beloch, Die Attische Politik seit Pericles (Leipzig:
Tuebner Verlag, 1884), p. 176.
27 The decree was proposed by Diophantus of Sphettus, a political
ally of Eubulus--Demosthenes xix. 86.
280n Phooion and Eubulus see Aeschines On the Embassy 184. The
trial of Aeschines was a political trial and test .\Alhen Phocion and Eubulus appear in support of Aeschines it may be assumed that all three are poUtioal .. '
friends. For Meidias' support of Plutarchus of Eretria, the Euboean leader supported in 348, see Demosthenes xxi. 110: 200. For Meld1as a8 an ally of
Eubulus see Dcmosthenes xxi. 205-07.
29Demosthenes xix. 10-11: Aeachines On the Embassy 57-60.
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CawkweU that "Eubulus' polJ.cy of abandoning mere war of oonquest and
s.eking collective seour1ty was the only chance of .ucce•• aDd it fa.lled not
because it we • .Ill-judged but becau.e th. new naUcmal .tate was led by a

great general ... 30 At the ..me Ume Eubulus opposed any war to l1herate
Amphlpo11. and ......ert Athenian dom1n.aUon in the northwestern. Aegean. ThJ.a

oppo.Won would explaJn why the people did not ,lve approval to the plans
Demol'then•• IWOposed for offensive military acUon 1n that area. In short,
Bubulus was not prepared to have what he oonaidered the be.1.e defanee po.ltiona of Athen. JeopardJsed, D.OI' was he prepared to commit Athen. 1n force to

area. where the vltal needs of the oity were not at .take.
It appeara that Eubulu. bad aeverel ba.io rea.ons for .uch a poUcy

F1rIt of all, a . . .loch cogently po1nts out, Athena had .truggled without .uc::c ••• fer three years with second-rate powers 1n the Soc1al War and 1ndeed had

oome to the edge of financial and military di..... Eubulus realized that
Athen. could not

cany on ".me Pol1t1k 1m grossen SUl" a.

she did In the fifth

century.31 Seoondly, if Aeachines' personal op1n1on may be accepted as

30 0 • L. cawkwell, "Eubulu., It Jgumal of Htlle*
LXXXIII (1963), 67.

re-

1tud1t1,

31 Be1och , 175. So also A. W. P1cJc.ard.-Cambridge, Demo,thg.
and the LaB paD s# COM fr!tdqm-3Q4-322 B,C, (New York: O. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1914). p. 126.
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fleeting that of Eubulu., Eubulu. did not feel the fanaUcal hatred and mstruat

of Ph111p wb1ch gripped Demoathene.. Where Demostben•• can only hurl

epithet. of hatred and abuse at PhW.p, Ae.abJ.ne. w1ll admit that Philip ha. a
good memory and great eloquence. 32 appear. to PUt more truat in oath. and

treaUe. made with PhWp,33 and in general .vOid. violent invective with regard

to PhWp. He even .tronIly impUed in hi. Speech AtIINt Cte.1Rhon that the
Hellene••hould have made peace with Philip and not have gone to Cllaerone••~
Th1rdly, Eubulu. wanted to avoid war

.0

that Athena might "oy f1nanc1al and

econom1o strength--a fact wh10h nNdt no further proof, .0 strongly did It
cbaraoter1&e the thlnklng of Bubulu ••
Eubulus

we. tiso concerned about equality within the atete.

Se

was long head of the 'l'heorlc Fund and waf tru.ted by the people in this post. 35
And he al.o .upported the public wc.-k. progza., as 1s clear from Aesch1ll•• and

32Aesch1nes On the

EP"v 42-43.

33Aesch1nes On lb,

EmbaSSY

137~38.

34Aeschines Malnat geliPb9D 148-51 •
35AeseRine. AAl1nIt g ••1orum 2:). Of. Scjw1 t Ae.gi1Bt, 111. 25
on tb1a point. Even the arch-enemy of Eubulu., Arnold Schaefer, .dmta that
he enjoyed confidenoe as head of the Theorto Fund-Schaefer, U, 307.
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Dlnarcbus as well as from Demosthenes .36 Unfortunately, not one word
uttered by Eubulus has come down to us (his oratorical abUity was probably not
outstanding, and Aeschines may well have been his spokesman before the popu
lar Assembly), and as a result his views on this quesUon of equality must be
determined from the activiUes he supported. But since the Theor1c Fund and th
public works proglam played such an Important part in promot1n9 full equality,
Eubulu.' own view. on equallty may be conjectured safely enough.
Demosthenes' ftrm promotion of the ends aimed at by the Theor1c
Fund and hi. baste sympatJrt for the Fund itself as a means of giving assl.-

tance to the poor has been d1scu••ed at some length. What of Eubulus' views
and pollcles? Not a great deal Is known for, again, no speech of Eubulus 1s
extant. It 1. quite clear, however, that he was connected closely with the
Theor1c Fund. Theopompus' caustic crlticism of Eubulus for hi. dtatrlbutlons
of the revenue. of the .tate has already been recorded. There is, of course,

Aeschines' explic1t statement 11nking Eubulus with the direction of the Theor1c
Board •37 Phllinus a180 a ••ociated Eubulus in pa.rt1cular with the Theor1c Fund
36

.

Aeschines M.tyt Qte.lpbon 25-26: Dinarchus Against
DtJp2sthent. 96: Demosthene. W. 28-32.
37Mschine. Ag,Wt Ct,sipbon 2S.
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distributions. 38 Indeed, Eubulus' association with the Fund was probably the
factor which supported his power in the state. Aesch1nes relate.:
• • • because of the trust which you placed in Eubulus, those who were
elected Superintendents of the Theone Fund held • • • the office of Couptroller of the Treasury and the office of Receiver of Money: they also controlled the dockyards, had charge of the naval arsenal that was buUdtng,
and were Superintendenuof \,..ets: almost the whole adm1n1stration of
the state was in their hands.
Thes. central1zations of power, Aeschines indicates, occurred at the Ume when
Eubulus was in Charve of the Theonc Fund. And so, as Beloch puts It, Eubulus
found in the Theonc Fund an apt instrument to give him control of the pol1c1es
of the state without baving to seek the office of general. 40 It is also plain

that Eubulus was a protector of the Theorlc Fund, for though Demosthenes
called for the Theone money to be used to support an Athenian effort at

Olynthus his plan was not approved, and the motion of Apollodorus, made a few
months later, was ultimately quashed. As Eubulus was in the ascendancy at
this time, it 1s clear that he withheld his support from these measures. And in
346 Eubulus used the Theoric Fund as a lever to secure the Peace of
38HarpocraUon

Lexicon in Decem Orttcua Attioo' s.v.

contain. a citation of this historian.
39Aesch1nes AalWt Cl!siph2D 25.
40Beloch, 179.

SEIDe t xci

128

Phllocrates .41 But wh.iV.t it has already been demonstrated that the Tbeor1c
Fund In the time of Demosthenes and Eubulus was a matter of distributing the

surpluses of the revenue, it 1s not clear when this ohallge from the early Fund
was instigated. Eubulus is often named as the promoter of this change, but
there is no ancient evidence to this effect. Eubulul did, however, insure the
continuity of the distributions by the

laWI regardlnq

the a.s1gnment of the sur-

pluses to the Theoric Fund. It has been shown that such a law was put Into effeet during the early period of Eubulus' polltical dominance. Thla fact is perhaps the stronge.t proof of Eubulus' .trong support for the Fund. But a.lde from
this infermation not much 1s really mown In a c:U.rect fa.hion about Eubulus t
activity In connection with the Fund. A great many Judgements have been made
about his popularity be1n{l due to the doles, his greed for power, h1a myopic
vision of Athenian foreign pollcy, but these are conclusions drawn from this
evidence by modem authors rather than attested faet. And, as has been indicated, it is difficult to square such Judgementa with the totality of faats known
of Eubulus' acUvlty.

And so Demosthanes and Eubulus both stru9gled, each In the way
that leemed best to hlmaelf and to his party, to preserve the autonomy and
equallty of the Athenian democ:racy. Whlle Demosthenes opted for total war and
41 Demosthenes xix. 291.
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thus was more ready to sacrifice the "glue of the democracy", the Th.eor1con,

to reach what he felt to be more important g081s, Eubulus opted for a more
limited defense perimeter and within this defined but well-defended area to
maintain civ10 equality particularly by means of the Tbeoric Fund and the work
of the Theoric Board and to promote the economic growth of the city. 42

Demosthenes' pattern was the more active, a striving for quick, decisive resulta; Eubulus chose a 8l0w but steady strengthening of the city.
It might be thought that Chaeroneia definitively proved the weakness of Demosthenes' analysts of the problems Athens had to deal with. For
though Athens had the support of troops from Euboea, Acha•• , Megara,
421t may be profitable to examine 1n achematic farm the comparative actions of Demosthenes and Eubulus in three difference instances which _
well documented enough to provide a contrasting view:.
Demosthenes
Eubulus
352 Supported action of EubulusSent strong force to Thermopylae
Demo.thenes xix. 86.
to protect it from PhUlp-Demosthenes xix. 86.

Felt expedition should have been
sent to wage offensive war-Demosth.nes 11i. 5. Urged offen- '-'
sive war-Demostheneslv.17-18.

Planned expedition to protect
Charsonese; expedition not sent
because of lessening of dangerDemoathanes W. 4-5.

Urged pay be given for service
instead of having Theodc distributions- Demosthenes .' xW.

JUan not aocepted--(Theor1c
distributions continued) •

130

349/8 Urged support for Olynthusi offensive action against Philip-Demosthenes 1; 11i.
Urged Theoric money be used for
military purposes--Demosthenes

Limited expeditions sent to
Olynthus; no offensive action
taken.
Plan not accepted--(Demosthenes) lix. 3-8.

i; 111.

346

Against diverting military forces
to Euboea--Demosthenes v. 5.

Promoted expedition to protect
Euboea--Demosthenes v. 5:
Aeschines 11. 184.

Strenuously supported peace
with Philip. Early supporter
of various peace measures.
Supported Philocrates-Mschines 11. 14; 11, 18.

Promoted Pan-Hellenic Confederation against Phil!p--Aeschines
11. 51-60; Demo.thene.xix. 304.
Sent expedition to hold Thermopylae against Philip. EXpedition
rejected by Phoclanl-Aeschines
U.133.
Then sought peace with Philip;
used Theoric Fund as lever to
promote peace--Demosthenes xix.
291; A.schines 11. 19.

Wanted peace only 81 a
breathing space--Demosthenes
v. 13; 24-25.

Wanted to make peace into a
general peace--Demosthenes xix.
14; Aeschines 111. 69-11.

Peace of Philocrate. obtained.

Peace of Phllocrates obtained.

This peace originally supported
by both men.
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Acarnania, Leucas, Corcyra, and, most important, Thebes,and though she herself was totally mobilized and was well-financed and though the Theone Fund
had been converted for the moment to military purposes, the Hellenic forces,
out-generaled, were decisively defeated. And thus real autonomy for the
Greek ciUes came to an end, despite an effort on Philip'a part to maintain
appearances. But Demosthenes I own defense deserves a hearing:
You must not accuse me of crime, because Philip happened to win the
battle; for the event was in God's hands, not mine. Show me that I did
not adopt, as far as human caleulaUon could go, all the II1Msures that
were pracUcable, or that I did not carry them out with honesty and diligence, and with an industry that overtaxed my strength; or .1s. show me
that the enterprises I inlUated were not honorable I worthy of Athens I and
inevitable. Prove that, and then denounce me; but not tW then. 43
Athens had been defeated under the leadership of Demosthenes, but in • valian
cause, the defense of Athenian autonomy and 1IIlI.
served the city well once

wei"

But though Oemosthenes

with PhUlp becazr..e lnevitable, it 18 fair to ask

whether auch war was indeed inevitable. Eubulus' group had not wanted Athen
to provoke Philip once the Peace had been made. They believed that Athens
could enjoy both autonomy and a good life for all her citizens. But Demosthenes ever looked upon Philip as "the enemy" and was willing to make sacr1fices in the struggle for equality so that autonomy might be maintained.
However, the powerful naUonal state of Macedon under Philip, a truly excel430emosthenes xvW. 193.
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lent general, prevailed; and Athens lost her autonomy. V'lhlle the Theoric Fund
was soon restored and life within the city went on again, Athens oould never be
the same. The bothersome question remains whether under the more cautious
policy of peace with honor, strong defense, and civic equality of Eubulus, suell
a fate might have been postponed, perhaps for quite a time. Perhaps,
realistically-speaking, the expanding nation of Macedon would not and could
not have been long delayed by Athens, whatever action she took. For the days
of the city-state were numbered; the empire was about to appear as the

dominant ruling force in the Mediterranean basin. Politicians such as Eubulus
and Demosthenes cannot foretell the future nor do they often perceive the
underlying trend of events. They are too close to their own times. Rather,
they must deal with the realities they encounter in terms of their own experience and the collective experience of their people. Philip of Macedon was
something new. Eubulus might look to the encounter with the Persians for a
clue and decide that a common peace was the answer. Demosthenes might look
to the Atens of the First Confederation which ruled by its own power the cities
and islands of the Aegean for a clue and determine that a strong citizen army
was the real answer. But Macedc;m was not Persia and it certainly was not
Sparta; it was nothing like a City-state and it was not yet an empire of disparate peoples bound together only by military force. The Macedon of Philip
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was a nation, and under him it became a nation in arms. In the long run the
many Greek cities with their varied loyalties could never resist a determined
effort by such a nation. Chaeroneia was only the proof of this fact and not
really a proof for the adequacies or inadequacies of the policies of Eubulus and
Demosthenes
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